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Taxing Profits from International Maritime Shipping in Africa: Past, 
Present and Future of UN Model Article 8 (Alternative B) 
 





International maritime shipping is an essential part of global business. Since the 
establishment of the current international tax regime in the 1920s, there has been a 
consensus that profits generated by this business are taxable only in the residence state – 
the state where the shipowners are located. Source states – the port states where business 
physically takes place – are generally expected to exempt income from international 
shipping. 
 
This standard is currently reflected in Article 8 of the OECD Model and Article 8 (Alternative 
A) of the UN Model, and is incorporated in the vast majority of bilateral tax treaties currently 
in force. 
 
Exclusive residence state taxation of shipping profits is problematic when the size of 
mercantile fleets and shipping flows between two states are of unequal size. This is often the 
case in relations between a developed and developing country. The latter often lack a 
substantial domestic mercantile fleet but serve as an important revenue-generating port state 
for the fleet of the developed country. To come to a more balanced allocation of taxing rights 
in such a case, a source taxation alternative has been inserted in UN Model Article 8 
(Alternative B). From its inception, Article 8B has been labelled impractical due to the lack of 
guidance on core issues, like sourcing rules and profit allocation. This gap is said to explain 
the low adoption rate of Article 8B in global tax treaty practice. 
 
In reality, tax treaty practice regarding Article 8B is heavily concentrated and flourishing in a 
handful of countries in South/South-East Asia – Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Myanmar, 
Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Thailand. All these countries subject non-resident 
shipping income to tax in their domestic income tax laws. Except for India, all countries are 
able to exercise these domestic tax law rules in relation to shipping enterprises located in the 
biggest shipowner states, either because they have a treaty in place that provides for source 
taxation or because there is no treaty at all and thus no restriction of domestic law. 
 
None of the relevant tax treaties contain a provision that incorporates the exact wording of 
Article 8B of the UN Model. If other countries, like coastal countries in sub-Saharan Africa, 
are looking to implement source taxation of maritime shipping income in the future, they are 
advised to draw on the South/South-East Asian experience. Best practice can be distilled 
regarding sourcing rule, source tax limitation, profit attribution and method of taxation (on 
gross or net basis). In addition to technical guidance on tax, the South/South-East Asian 
experience also provides important general policy considerations countries should take into 
account when determining whether source taxation of maritime shipping profits is an 
appropriate target for their future tax treaty negotiations. 
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1  Introduction 
 
International transport is an essential part of global trade. The international maritime shipping 
industry was valued at approximately US$12 trillion in 2017.1 It operates an inherently 
globalised business with over 60,000 sea vessels, transporting goods and passengers 
across the world and calling at numerous different ports and countries.2 The demand for 
international shipping of goods is largely determined by developments in the world economy. 
In volume loaded, maritime trade has increased by a factor of four between 1970 and 2018. 
Certain segments of the industry are even said to have profited from the COVID-19 crisis, 
with profits rising as a result of an increase in transport activity during and in the aftermath of 
the pandemic years (The Economist 2020).3 
 
Despite the ever-increasing demand and reasonably steady profits, the shipping industry is a 
notoriously odd duck in the pond of corporate profit taxation. For decades, the industry has 
benefited from low effective tax rates on their global profits. Two elements contribute to this 
outcome.  
 
First, for decades shipping companies have benefitted from beneficial tax regimes. 
Residence states – the states where the shipping companies are located – have engaged in 
tax competition to preserve or expand their domestic merchant fleets. This has led to a 
recurrent reduction in tax rates in residence states, in what can only be referred to as a race 
to the bottom.  
 
The second element contributing to the low effective tax rate on global profits is the 
seemingly international consensus that profits from international shipping should only be 
taxed in the residence state (where these profits are often taxed at low rates), whereas 
source states – the states between which the transport takes place – should refrain from 
taxing shipping income.  
 
In a nutshell, when it comes to allocation of taxing rights under a tax treaty, Article 8 of the 
OECD Model and Article 8 (Alternative A) of the UN Model allocate the right to tax 
international shipping profits exclusively to the residence state – the place where the 
enterprise that operates the vessel is located.4 This model provision currently figures in a 
large majority of the bilateral tax treaty network, which accounts for more than 3,500 
individual bilateral tax treaties. 
 
The rule of exclusive residence state taxation of international shipping profits might be a 
stable feature of most bilateral tax treaties, but it is not universally supported. Since the 
models were developed, developing countries have voiced concern about the unbalanced 
revenue effects of this rule when a country is an important shipping destination, but does not 
have a significant domestic shipping business. These concerns led to the inclusion of Article 
8 (Alternative B) of the UN Model. Alternative B provides for source state taxation of profits 
 
1  The value attributed to global seaborne container trade according to Statista, Container Shipping - Statistics & Facts 
(2017). 
2  International Chamber of Shipping, letter to all full and associate members (ICS(13)44), attachment 2, Treatment of 
Shipping in the UN Double Taxation Convention Between Developed and Developing Countries – Comments by the 
International Chamber of Shipping and the World Shipping Council 1 (17 Sept. 2013). 
3  The Economist reports that Maersk, the world’s biggest container-shipping firm with 17% of the market, expects profits 
of US$6-7 billion, up from a pre-pandemic estimate of US$5.5 billion. Shipping rates for container transport from Asia to 
the US West Coast have risen by 50% in the third quarter of 2020 compared to 2019. The rates for shipping from Asia 
to West Africa have risen by 18%. 
4  The official title of the UN Model is ‘United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and 






from international transport by sea, with residual taxing rights for the residence state of the 
economic operator. Countries electing to employ Alternative B in their tax treaties must 
therefore agree, using objective allocation criteria, how they will apportion profits between the 
residence and source state. It is clear that Alternative B was designed specifically to take into 
account the needs and circumstances of certain coastal low- and middle-income countries 
that would like to tax shipping activities taking place in their territories.  
 
Despite the above, Alternative B has not found its way into the tax treaty practice of many of 
those countries, including sub-Saharan countries in Africa. It is illustrative that the 2016 
ATAF Model Agreement for the Elimination of Double Taxation with respect to Taxes on 
Income and the Prevention of Tax Avoidance and Evasion (the ATAF Model),5 and its update 
in 2019, follow the traditional line of exclusive residence state taxation of profits from 
international transport. The ATAF Model incorporates Article 8 of the OECD Model and 
Article 8 (Alternative A) of the UN Model, and thereby expressly dismisses the alternative 
approach suggested in Article 8 (Alternative B) of the UN Model.6 The drafters of the ATAF 
Model do not indicate why they chose to leave Article 8B out of the ATAF Model. 
Presumably, the preference for exclusive residence state taxation was included simply 
because it reflects current tax treaty practice among ATAF member states.  
 
However, different signals are heard from individual ATAF member countries. The ATAF 
Model’s support for exclusive residence state taxation in Article 8(1) has triggered more 
reservations by member countries than any other provision of the ATAF Model. Ten of the 
thirty-eight ATAF members (including 8 of the 25 sea-connected countries) have indicated a 
preference for source taxation of profits from international transport – though, of these ten, 
only Nigeria has any treaties in force that provide for it.7 
 
This contribution aims to assist these countries to answer the following questions: 
 
• Which are the core elements of the international transport business that are of relevance 
when deciding on the inclusion of Article 8B in a tax treaty? 
• What is the historical backstory of the apparent consensus on exclusive residence state 
taxation of shipping profits in Article 8 of the OECD Model, and the seemingly unpopular 
and underexplored alternative provided in Article 8 (Alternative B) of the UN Model? 
• What is actual current treaty practice regarding Article 8 (Alternative B). Are there 
countries around the globe that have successfully embraced source taxation of shipping 
profits, and which technical drafting options have they used in their treaties and their 
domestic tax law? 
• Which are the most important policy aspects from an economic perspective in relation to 
adoption of source taxation of shipping profits? 
 
Starting with a concise description of the international maritime business, the paper then 
provides an overview of the status and history behind the current consensus that profits 
 
5  In 2016, the African Tax Administrators Forum (ATAF) released the first edition of the ATAF Model. ATAF’s membership 
includes tax authorities from 38 countries situated in Africa, and the ATAF Model is a regional model that represents a 
hybrid version of the OECD and UN Models, reflecting the tax treaty policy preferences of the ATAF jurisdictions. The 
ATAF Model reflects an increased awareness amongst African nations of the importance of a tax treaty policy that is 
tailored to fit the region’s own interests. The ATAF Model (2016) is available at: ATAF Income Tax Model Convention 
(2016), Treaties and Models, IBFD.  
6  See Article 8 of ATAF Income Tax Model Convention (2016) and (2019), Treaties and Models, IBFD, and Article 8 
(Alternative B) of the UN Model (United Nations 2017). 
7  See ATAF Income Model Convention (2019), Annex – Reservations on Article 8, Treaties and Models, IBFD. The 
countries reserving the right to tax maritime transport profits at source are: Benin, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Togo and Uganda. The countries reserving the right to tax air transport profits at source are: Benin, 






made by international transport companies should be taxed exclusively in the state of 
residence of the economic operator. The focus then switches to analysing the global tax 
treaty network with regard to adoption of Alternative B in actual treaty practice. The analysis 
identifies eight South/South-East Asian countries that have fully embraced source taxation of 
transport profits in their bilateral tax treaty networks.  
 
The final part of this article presents a set of guidelines for the development of a tax treaty 
policy to tax international maritime shipping income at source.  
 
The scope of this study is restricted to the allocation of source state taxing rights on profits 
from maritime shipping. Transport by air is not covered. Article 8 (Alternative B) of the UN 
Model only applies to international transport by sea. There are nevertheless valid theoretical 
grounds to argue that air transport profits should be treated along the same lines as maritime 
shipping profits. In practice, however, even countries that have embraced Article 8 
(Alternative B) in their tax treaty policies rarely extend source taxation of transport profits to 
include transport by air. This is most likely explained by the fact that source taxation of 
maritime shipping is less likely to give rise to market distortion than air transport. In the 
Philippines, the only country that has developed a substantial practice of taxing air transport 
at source, it was this perceived negative impact of source taxation on the country as a flight 
destination by foreign airlines that made the country decide in 2013 to relinquish its principled 
stance on source taxation. Significantly, the Philippines continues to levy source taxation on 
maritime shipping profits. The findings of this study might nevertheless be relevant for future 
studies of taxation of air transport at source. 
 
 
2  The international transport business and 
developing countries 
 
International maritime transport covers transport of goods and passengers between two 
separate countries. International maritime transport of goods is the backbone of globalised 
trade and the manufacturing supply chain. UNCTAD reports that developing countries 
account for most global maritime flows, both in terms of exports (goods loaded) and imports 
(goods unloaded). In 2018, developing countries loaded an estimated 58.8 per cent and 
unloaded 64.5 per cent of total goods transported by sea. The prominent role of developing 
countries reflects their ever-growing role as major exporters of raw materials, as well as 
major exporters and importers of finished and semi-finished products (UNCTAD 2019: sec 
1.3:8). In contrast, international maritime transport of passengers is not a sizeable economic 
activity compared to the transport of goods in most developing countries and most countries 
in Africa, nor is it expected to be in the future. 
 
As with any other type of business profits, tax on international transport profits is (in the first 
place) levied by the state where the owner is resident. This may be different to the country in 
which the vessel is registered. Based on vessel value estimates for 2019, the ten biggest 
shipowner countries in the world are Greece, Japan, China, Singapore, Norway, US, 
Germany, South Korea, UK and Denmark. Most of the world’s mercantile fleet ownership is 
in these countries. The share of the mercantile fleet outside Asia, Europe and North America 
– especially that of Africa - is insignificant, and certainly does not reflect the proportion of 
these regions in the world’s total seaborne trade.  
 
In brief – the business mostly takes place in developing countries, but is almost fully owned 






3  Taxation of international transport business 
profits  
 
3.1 Allocation of taxing rights between states 
 
3.1.1 Article 8 of the OECD Model: the standard of exclusive residence state taxation  
 
The main rule on allocation of taxing rights between states on profits from the operation of 
ships and aircraft in international traffic, currently employed in the vast majority of more than 
3,000 bilateral tax treaties currently in force, is modelled after Article 8 of the OECD Model. 
The Article provides that profits from international traffic are taxable solely in the state were 
the enterprise operating the ship or aircraft is resident. International traffic is defined in 
paragraph 3 of the OECD Model as ‘any transport by a ship or aircraft except when the ship 
or aircraft is operated solely between places in a Contracting State and the enterprise that 
operates the ship or aircraft is not an enterprise of that State’.  
 
To understand why this provision came to be as we know it today, we have to delve into the 
history of the world’s first tax treaty models. Like many rules of international taxation, the 
current apparent global consensus of exclusive residence state taxation of international 
shipping profits is ultimately based on an agreement struck by policymakers under the 
auspices of the League of Nations in the 1920s. In developing the first ‘draft bilateral 
convention for the prevention of double taxation’, the technical experts of the League of 
Nations determined the standard to be exclusive residence state taxation of international 
shipping profits for two reasons – reciprocity and enforceability. 
 
The experts’ conclusion was based on state practice. In the first decades of the 20th century, 
certain states started adopting reciprocal exemptions for international shipping profits in their 
domestic laws. Especially for states with a sizeable domestic shipping industry at the time – 
like the US, UK or France – it made sense to exempt (as the source state) profits of foreign 
shipping companies on the condition that the foreign country granted a similar exemption to 
its own shipping companies. Article 8 of the OECD Model institutionalised this practice. 
 
Secondly, and more importantly, the technical experts appointed by the League of Nations 
concluded that with regard to profits realised by international shipping companies, an 
exception was needed from the permanent establishment (PE) rule. Under the PE rule, 
business profits are only taxable in the source state if the economic activity in said state 
meets a certain threshold – for instance, if the taxpayer disposes of a fixed place of business 
in the source state. When the activities of a shipping company in the source state went 
beyond its vessels just calling in local ports, the PE threshold is met if the company disposes 
of facilities to load and unload ships. An exception to the PE rule was however said to be 
justified based on the following grounds: ‘in view of the very particular nature of their 
activities and of the difficulty of apportioning their profits, particularly in the case of 
companies operating in a number of countries, the experts admit an exception to this 
principle’ (League of Nations 1925: I(2)(a)). 
 
The resolution by the technical experts – all practical thinkers, appointed national 
government officials – contrasted sharply with the preceding findings of the ‘four economists’. 
In their seminal 1923 Report on Double Taxation, a report commissioned by the League of 
Nations to explore the theoretical underpinnings of the allocation of taxing rights on cross-
border income, the four economists applied the theory of economic allegiance (League of 






taxing rights based on the assessment of four elements – origin, situs, enforceability and 
domicile –of the taxpayer and their cross-border income. The four economists came to the 
following conclusions with regard to the economic allegiance of a taxpayer’s income from 
international shipping activities:  
 
1. With regard to the origin of income from ships carrying on international transport 
activities, they concluded that: ‘If the vessels ply the high seas, there is no particular 
country to which the origin of the yield can be ascribed. If, however, they ply navigable 
waters which traverse different countries, we have, as in several of the preceding 
categories, not one, but several, places of origin, […]. Moreover, in the case of ocean 
liners there are apt to be in several countries large and extensive docks and appurtenant 
property which materially contribute to the profitable operation of the vessels.’ They 
added that: ‘in as much as the economic yield of vessels depends partly on the 
seamanship of the captain and to a larger degree upon the business sagacity of the 
owner, the element of personal management becomes of importance, and that this 
management may be carried on in the one or the other country. But, as in the case of 
immovables, the controlling consideration is the existence of the traffic: origin therefore 
re-enforces domicile (the home of the owner) only to a partial extent’.  
2. Likewise, the situs of shipping income could not be ascribed to a single taxable 
sovereignty. 
3. The domicile of the shipowner had a subsidiary importance compared to other factors – it 
could only reinforce the other factors.  
4. In contrast, enforceability was closely related to the country in which the ship was 
registered (League of Nations 1923: 33).  
 
Finally, the four economists concluded that when a ship traverses different countries, the 
origin of the income becomes more important than other elements: ‘A Dutch flag on a boat 
plying on the German Rhine should not exempt the vessel from its economic allegiance to 
Germany’. For ocean liners they concluded that: ‘Registry is the chief consideration (because 
of enforceability considerations), but for purposes of income tax […] the other country, where 
expensive docks and shipping offices are found, might reasonably prefer a claim to a part of 
the earnings’ (League of Nations 1923: 33). 
 
Similar opinions were raised in the International Shipping Conference of 1926. For this 
reason, the Conference took the view that international shipping profits had to be dealt with 
in a comprehensive tax treaty so that the one-sided exclusive allocation of taxing rights to the 
residence state could be balanced by other benefits in favour of the source state.8 
 
These are important observations. From a historical perspective, exclusive residence state 
taxation of shipping profits prevailed, not because of its theoretical underpinnings or its 
inherent fairness, but because of practical reasons – lack of data in the source state, and 
lack of workable profit attribution rules.  
 
The rest is history. Source state abdication of taxing rights on shipping profits was endorsed 
in the first League of Nations Draft Model (1927), and subsequent Mexico Model (1943) and 
London Model (1946). The OECD Draft (1963) and OECD Model (1977 and subsequent 
updates) adopted the criterion of exclusive taxation in the state where the place of effective 
management (PoEM) of the international transport enterprise was established. In the 2014 
update of the OECD Model, the PoEM was replaced with the residence criterion, allegedly to 
 
8  Resolution relating to double taxation adopted by the International Shipping Conference in April 1926, as reported in 






better reflect current treaty practice of the majority of OECD member countries and non-
OECD countries (OECD 2013: para 2). 
 
The OECD’s strong support for exclusive residence state taxation of international shipping 
income was most recently restated in the context of the digital economy debate. In the 2020 
Report on the Pillar One Blueprint, the Inclusive Framework on BEPS states that: ‘it would be 
inappropriate to include airline and shipping businesses in the scope of the new taxing right’ 
(i.e. a source state taxing rights on business profits that do not meet the PE threshold). The 
earnings of international shipping were said to be based on the use of vessels operating in 
the high seas and multiple tax jurisdictions, and this creates considerable allocation 
challenges. The report continues that, for this reason, there is a longstanding international 
consensus that the profits of enterprises operating ships or aircraft in international traffic 
should be taxable only in the jurisdiction in which the enterprise has its residence, even 
though these activities would commonly give rise to physical presence in the source state 
that would give rise to a permanent establishment. Exclusive taxation is however said to 
remove the compliance and administrative burdens that would otherwise arise, especially 
over the attribution of profits (OECD 2020a: paras 156-163). 
 
Granted, international shipping activities – a field which by the OECD’s own admission 
involves physical presence in source states – do not fit the description of remote digital 
activities (activities without physical presence in the source state) currently considered in the 
Pillar One debate. Yet the Report’s reference to profit allocation challenges, and compliance 
and administrative burdens, in the field of international shipping as justification for the carve-
out are not convincing and are anachronistic. They are rooted in a 1920s’ conception of 
enforceability. If new nexus and profit attribution rules ought to be devised in the context of 
the digital economy, it should a fortiori be possible in this age of data and digitalisation to 
devise such rules for the ‘bricks-and-mortar’ business of international shipping, without these 
rules being unenforceable.9  
 
As to the ‘longstanding international consensus’ regarding exclusive residence taxation, the 
above shows that from the onset of the development of the League of Nations/OEEC/OECD 
Models, the opinio juris regarding exclusive residence state taxation was not unanimous. It is 
this dissent that would eventually lead to the development of Article 8 (Alternative B) of the 
UN Model (see below). As to the ‘state practice’ that supports this consensus, it is clear that 
the OECD Model rule is embraced in a vast majority of the more than 3,000 tax treaties 
currently in force. But the practice is not unanimously endorsed by all countries. We show 
how a small number of countries have radically abandoned exclusive residence state 
taxation in nearly all of their tax treaties in section 4.2.  
 
3.1.2 Exclusive residence state taxation in practice: subsidy race to the bottom and 
low ETRs 
 
One of the consequences of exclusive residence state taxation of international transport – a 
highly globalised and mobile sector – is that the business was and is exposed, more than 
any other type of business, to forces of tax competition and to a lower and declining average 
effective tax rate (ETR), compared to other industries. 
 
It was established above that ownership of the maritime shipping business is concentrated in 
enterprises located in a handful of states, mostly OECD member states. A 2019 report by the 
International Transport Forum – an intergovernmental organisation integrated with the OECD 
– reveals that OECD countries spend at least €3 billion per year on three maritime subsidies: 
 






tonnage taxes, tax exemptions for fuel for domestic shipping, and fiscal measures to reduce 
wage costs of seafarers (ITF 2019: 7). Tonnage tax is the most important (implicit) maritime 
subsidy. It is a special tax regime for shipping companies under which a notional profit is 
computed based on the number and size of ships operated, with other corporate income tax 
rules for depreciation and losses being adjusted. The standard rate of corporate income tax 
is then applied to the deemed profit, yet the tonnage rate is generally set in such a way that 
actual tax paid is minimal. 
 
Most major shipowner countries in the world employ a tonnage tax system, mainly for 
defensive rather than strategic reasons – large and increasing amounts of money are spent 
on retaining national shipping industries. Subsidies like tonnage tax systems have risen in 
popularity in reaction to two developments – the use of flags of convenience and open 
shipping registries, and the use of subsidies in other shipowner countries, thereby effectively 
creating a so-called race to the bottom. Tonnage tax systems are generally not considered 
harmful tax practices. The tonnage tax regimes that have been scrutinised by the Inclusive 
Framework on BEPS Action 5 (Harmful Tax Practices) have generally been deemed 
compliant with the substantive activity requirement and transparency standard, formulated in 
the 2015 report (OECD 2015a; OECD 2020b). Further, the tonnage tax systems granted by 
EU member states are subject to control by the EU Commission when they fall under the 
legal definition of state aid. To the extent that the countries grant benefits of their respective 
scheme to all vessels flying the flag of any EU Member State, tonnage tax regimes are 
usually approved by the EU Commission.10  
 
As such, there are two aspects to the international consensus on exclusive residence state 
taxation. First, there is consensus that source states should in any circumstance refrain from 
taxing international shipping income. Second, there also seems to be a consensus that 
residence states are entitled to forego fully exercising their exclusive taxing right by 
introducing subsidies and preferential regimes, thereby effectively making the international 
transport business an undertaxed industry.  
 
It has been reported that over the period 2005-2019 maritime transport firms enjoyed an ETR 
of around 7 per cent. The tax burdens fluctuate per region: the highest rates were observed 
in Europe (11%) and Asia (12%). The lowest burdens were observed in North America (0%). 
The cruise shipping business – mostly owned by US companies – is the segment benefitting 
from an average ETR close to 0 per cent (Merk 2020: 256). Air transport companies also 
generally benefit from low ETRs. Over the period 2015-2019, US air transport companies 
paid taxes at an average ETR around 6 per cent. European air transport companies paid 
taxes at an average ETR around 12 per cent. The average ETR across all sectors in the 
same period was 21 per cent for US companies, and 23 per cent for European companies 
(CEPR VOXeu 2020). 
 
The current state of affairs has been questioned in recent years. In a recent report, the 
OECD’s International Transport Forum (ITF) recommends a re-orientation and harmonisation 
of maritime subsidy policies to stop the race to the bottom, and to make benefits conditional 
on positive impacts – like the environmental footprint of ships. It further concludes that there 
is limited evidence that maritime subsidies achieve their stated aims – like defending 
domestic ship registers and seafarer employment (ITF 2019: 62). 
 
Similar statements have been made by leaders of the industry itself, including claims that 
shipping subsidies damage the international transport business by artificially increasing 
liquidity of shipping companies, allowing some of them to renew or expand their fleets. This 
 






contributed to increased overcapacity, which put pressure on global shipping rates – making 
it difficult to generate stable profits or recover from crises. 
 
3.1.3 Article 8 (Alternative B) of the UN Model: the source taxation alternative 
 
The arguments voiced but not heard during the development of the League of Nations and 
OECD Model regarding defending the allocation of taxing rights were eventually taken on 
board in development of the UN Model. 
 
In its resolution of 4 August 1967, the United Nations Economic and Social Council 
expressed its belief that ‘tax treaties between developed and developing countries can serve 
to promote the flow of investment useful to the economic development in the latter, especially 
if the treaties provide for favourable tax treatment to such investments on the part of the 
countries of origin’. Pursuant to the resolution the Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Tax Treaties 
between Developed and Developing Countries (the group of experts) was set up, composed 
of experts and administrators nominated by governments from developed and developing 
countries, but acting in a personal capacity (United Nations 1969: paras 1-3).  
 
In their First Report (1969), the group of experts highlight that several members from 
developed countries supported the position taken in Article 8 of the OECD Model. Several 
members from developing countries were not in favour of exclusive residence state taxation, 
which would de facto imply that they would not derive any tax revenue from international 
shipping. They asserted that their countries were not in a position to forgo even limited 
revenue from taxing foreign shipping enterprises while their own shipping industries were not 
more fully developed. It was recognised that there were considerable difficulties in 
determining a taxable profit in this situation. Various methods were proposed, one proposal 
being the source country to agree to a 50 per cent reduction of tax levied on foreign shipping 
profits. Issues like the impact of accelerated depreciation, tax deductions and government 
subsidies in the residence state on tax levied in the source state, were discussed (United 
Nations 1969: paras 65-68). 
 
In the Third Report (1972), the positions of the developed and developing countries were 
once more laid out, with the former restating the OECD point of view, and the latter 
reiterating that, from the standpoint of developing countries, the mutual exemption of 
shipping profits in the source state appeared to represent a somewhat outdated approach. 
The problem should not be looked at from the point of a special interest group or of 
traditional methods, but should be resolved in a manner that would give due consideration to 
the needs of developing countries (United Nations 1972: paras 13-15). The Members from a 
number of those countries added that Article 8 of the OECD Model was actually a deterrent 
for developing countries to sign tax treaties, as it worked exclusively in favour of developed 
countries. As the four economists had warned in 1923 (see section 3.1.1), it was said that 
consideration had to be given to the very substantial expenditure that developing countries 
incurred in the construction of airports and harbour facilities. The developing country experts 
therefore conclude that: ‘it would appear more reasonable to place the geographical source 
of profits from international transportation at the place where passengers or freight were 
booked. Considering those problems, an apportionment of shipping profits on the basis of 
turnover would appear to provide a fair solution’ (United Nations 1972: para 16). 
 
Two different problem areas were identified – determination of shipping profits, and allocation 
of these profits to the various countries concerned. With respect to allocation of profits, 
suggestions were made both for a formula-based approach and for a unilateral attribution of 
profits similar to the attribution of profits to a PE. Several experts from both developed and 






double (or multiple) taxation of profits (United Nations 1972: para 21). Most members agreed 
that the adoption of a formula under which net profit, as determined by the residence country, 
would be multiplied by the ratio of gross receipts from outgoing freight originating in the 
country to gross receipts on a global basis (United Nations 1972: para 23). A member from a 
developed country observed that the question remained regarding the portion of income that 
should be allocated to the home country of the enterprise: ‘a shipping enterprise domiciled in 
a particular country might well conduct all its activities outside that country, with the result 
that nothing would be left for the latter to tax, although it contributed capital and management 
to the enterprise’ (United Nations 1972: para 26). Developing country members pointed out 
that an overall net profit figure computed under the rule of the home country might not always 
be acceptable in source countries, especially where the home country provided special 
depreciation, investment allowances or other benefits (United Nations 1972: para 27). 
 
The technical experts also discussed the source rule used for income to be allocated to a 
source country. It was believed that source countries should be able to tax shipping income if 
two conditions were fulfilled: (i) there was a permanent activity of some kind, such as a PE or 
a permanent representative, as distinguished from merely occasional contacts in the source 
country; and (ii) there was a sufficient intensity of connection between the enterprise and the 
source country (United Nations 1972: para 29). ‘A ship might visit a country repeatedly or it 
might call only once. But if the single call was a planned operation, the profits from the 
voyage should be taxable’ (United Nations 1972: para 32). 
 
The attribution of profits to the source state would occur as follows. The source state would 
be entitled to tax from outbound transport income – income from freight leaving its territory. 
In no circumstance should these profits exceed the proportion of worldwide profit that was 
attributable to the source country. 
 
The experts noted that a shipping enterprise that considered itself too heavily taxed under 
this method would be free to invoke competent authority procedures under the tax treaties. 
Special rules were to be devised to prevent shipping enterprise being taxed more 
excessively in source countries than ordinary business enterprises were under the PE rule 
(United Nations 1972: para 29-30). 
 
With regard to tax levied in the source state, it was observed that certain developing 
countries had reduced their tax on shipping profits to one-half under tax treaties. It was 
believed that ‘through such a concession, the cost of capital and management services 
provided by the home country was recognised’ (United Nations 1972: para 33). Albeit not 
reflected in the text of the Model provision, it was generally agreed that if source country tax 
was allowed, the focus should be on taxing outgoing freight, not inbound freight. If both were 
taxed in the source state, it might be advisable to have a different rate of reduction of 
domestic tax in that state – a lower deduction for outbound transport and a higher deduction 
for inbound transport. These nuances are not taken on board in the text of the Model 
provision (and the Commentary), which simply provides that the tax in the source state is to 
be reduced by a percentage to be established through bilateral negotiations. 
 
The technical experts discussed a report from a special advisor who suggested that two 
approaches should be considered. One approach would be exclusive residence state 
taxation, endorsed in the OECD Model. If that rule were to be abandoned, the question arose 
whether the taxation of shipping income should be governed by the PE rule, or whether 
specific rules for the shipping industry were necessary (United Nations 1972: para 39).  
 
The work of the Ad Hoc Group of Experts would eventually culminate in the adoption in 1979 






Developing Countries (United Nations 1979). The Manual presents a set of guidelines based 
on the technical experts’ discussions on issues arising in connection with the negotiation of 
tax treaties between developed and developing countries (United Nations 1979: 5). Guideline 
8A duplicated the text of Article 8 of the OECD Model (1977). Guideline 8B provides for the 
text which would come to known as Article 8 (Alternative B) of the UN Model (1980), and the 
observations expressed by the experts in the Manual were incorporated in the Commentary 
on Article 8 (Alternative B) of the UN Model (1980). Both model provision and commentary 
have remained unaltered since then. 
 
Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 8 Alternative B of the UN Model (2017) read: 
 
1. Profits of an enterprise of a Contracting State from the operation of aircraft in 
international traffic shall be taxable only in that State. 
2. Profits of an enterprise of a Contracting State from the operation of ships in international 
traffic shall be taxable only in that State unless the shipping activities arising from such 
operation in the other Contracting State are more than casual. If such activities are more 
than casual, such profits may be taxed in that other State. The profits to be taxed in that 
other State shall be determined on the basis of an appropriate allocation of the overall net 
profits derived by the enterprise from its shipping operations. The tax computed in 
accordance with such allocation shall then be reduced by ___ per cent. (The percentage 
is to be established through bilateral negotiations.) 
 
The most relevant observations in the Commentary are the following: 
 
• Article 8 (Alternative A)/Article 8 of the OECD Model is predicated, inter alea, on the 
premise that exemption in the source states ensures that enterprises will not be taxed in 
foreign countries if their overall operations turn out to be unprofitable.11 
• Article 8 (Alternative B) was inspired by certain countries asserting that they were not 
able to forgo even the limited revenue to be derived from taxing foreign shipping as long 
as their own shipping industries were not more fully developed.12 
• Article 8 (Alternative B) grants source state taxing rights on income from both regular or 
frequent shipping visits and irregular or isolated visits, provided the latter were planned 
and not merely fortuitous. ‘More than casual’ means a scheduled or planned visit of a 
ship to a particular country to pick up freight or passengers.13  
• Some countries did not agree on the inclusion of the ‘more than casual’ threshold in 
Article 8 (Alternative B), and other countries wished to extend Alternative B to cover 
profits from international air transport, considering the limited size of their domestic airline 
industry.14 
• The determination of the profits taxable in the source state should be based on 
determination of the overall profits in the state of residence (or PoEM state) of the 
shipping enterprise, with or without taking into account deductions of special allowances, 
incentives or subsidies granted in the latter state, and losses. The residence state issues 
source state taxable profit certificates in this regard.15 
• The apportionment of profits should preferably be based on the factor of outgoing freight 
receipts.16 
 
11  United Nations (2017), Commentary on Article 8 (Alternatives A and B), para. 9. 
12  United Nations (2017), Commentary on Article 8 (Alternatives A and B), para. 3. 
13  United Nations (2017), Commentary on Article 8 (Alternatives A and B), para. 13. 
14  United Nations (2017), Commentary on Article 8 (Alternatives A and B), para. 6. 
15  United Nations (2017), Commentary on Article 8 (Alternatives A and B), para. 14. 






• The source state accepts a reduction in tax due by application of its domestic tax law on 
the share of profits allocated to it. The reduction reflects the managerial and capital inputs 
originating in the country of residence.17 
 
Schematically, Article 8 (Alternative B) of the UN Model has the following elements: 
 
Article 8 (Alternative B) of the UN Model (2017): 
 
1. Income covered 
• Profits from the operation of ship in international traffic by a resident enterprise 
• Alternatively, also profits from operation of aircraft in international traffic by a resident 
enterprise 
• International traffic defined as any transport, except if operated solely between places in 
other state 
 
2. Residence state taxing rights 
• Residual taxing rights for resident enterprise/enterprise with PoEM in the state 
• Provides relief for double taxation (credit or exemption) 
 
3. Source state taxing rights 
• Shared taxing rights for income covered from activities that are ‘more than casual’. 
• Alternatively, shared taxing rights for any covered income 
• Sourcing rule: ‘income from the operation of international traffic in the source state’ 
 
4. Method of taxation (in source state) 
• Taxation on gross or on net basis 
• Reduction of domestic tax due by an agreed percentage, (possibly distinguishing 




3.2 Profit attribution rules for source state taxation  
 
3.2.1 Profit attribution rules in tax treaties and domestic law 
 
One of the most frequently heard criticisms of Article 8 (Alternative B) of the UN Model is that 
the Article is something of a lex imperfecta: the UN Model does not provide for clear 
guidance on profit attribution rules under Article 8B. Critics will argue that there is no point in 
agreeing to a source state taxing right on profits derived from international shipping, if no 
agreement can be struck on how the exact amount of these profits are to be determined.  
 
Indeed, on the issue of profit attribution, Article 8B merely provides that shipping profits 
taxable in the source state ‘shall be determined on the basis of an appropriate allocation of 
the overall net profits derived by the enterprise from its shipping operations’.18 The UN Model 
Commentary does not provide guidance on what constitutes an appropriate allocation. 
Countries including 8B-type provisions in their tax treaties are thus presented with two 
options: either they determine on a bilateral basis what constitutes an appropriate allocation 
and include attribution rules in the treaty provision, or they, individually, resort to their 
domestic law rules. 
 
17  United Nations (2017), Commentary on Article 8 (Alternatives A and B), para. 14. 







In practice, countries opted for the second alternative. The appropriate net allocation rule 
suggested in the UN Model has been a dead letter to date. Besides the fact that the model 
provision rule does not bring anything substantial to the table – what is an appropriate 
allocation? – the rule also expressly furthers net taxation of shipping profits. Most countries 
that embraced Article 8B in their tax treaty policy prefer to leave open the option of taxing 
source state shipping profits on a gross basis. Many of the relevant countries do so in their 
domestic tax law.19 For this to happen it would be counterproductive to include the 
appropriate net allocation rule.  
 
The perceived lacuna in Article 8B is thus filled in by domestic law. Most domestic tax 
systems do contain rudimentary sourcing and profit attribution rules on the taxation of non-
resident shipping profits. In many cases, these domestic tax law rules merely serve as a big 
stick to entice tax treaty partners to sign a tax treaty. As the signing of a tax treaty usually 
implies agreeing on exclusive residence state taxation, these domestic tax provisions are 
rarely applied in practice. 
 
But there are instances in which these domestic law rules on non-resident shipping income 
attribution do come into play. Besides the obvious (but rare) case of the relevant bilateral tax 
treaty incorporating an Article 8B provision, many pairs of countries do not have tax treaties 
in place – because they never signed one or because of tax treaty termination policies. In 
such cases, countries do tend to exercise their sovereign right to tax non-resident shipping 
company income that is sourced in their territory. Countries apply the profit attribution rules 
contained in their domestic law to determine how much income is sourced in their territory. 
 
The US terminating its shipping tax agreement with Hong Kong in 2020 illustrates the 
relevance of domestic rules. Both the US and Hong Kong are important shipowner nations, 
and, probably as a consequence, both countries employ a tax treaty policy of exclusive 
residence state taxation of shipping profits. Solidifying this reciprocal exemption was also the 
sole purpose of the United States Hong Kong Shipping Tax Agreement (1989).20 After 
termination of the Treaty, both states reverted to applying their domestic law rules on non-
resident shipping profits derived from 1 January 2021. These provisions include profit 
attribution rules. 
 
In the case of the US, Hong Kong shipping companies – like any other foreign shipping 
company that does not benefit from exemption because their home jurisdiction does not 
grant equivalent reciprocal exemption to US shipping companies – will derive taxable 
transportation income from US sources if the income is attributable to transportation which 
begins and ends in the US.21 The US Internal Revenue Code further provides that 50 per 
cent of US source transportation income is to be taxable either at a rate of 4 per cent on the 
gross amount of US source transportation income, or, if the foreign transport company: (a) 
maintains a fixed place of business in the US; and (b) at least 90 per cent of the Hong Kong 
company’s US source transportation income is attributable to regularly scheduled 
transportation, the income is treated as effectively connected to a US business and subject 
to the ordinary corporate tax rate of 21 per cent and a branch profit tax of 30 per cent on the 
net after-tax income.  
 
 
19  See section 4. 
20  See Agreement Constituted By Exchange Of Notes Between The Government Of The United States Of America And 
The Government Of Hong Kong For Double Taxation Relief In Respect Of Income From International Operation Of 
Ships, signed on 1 August 1989, Treaties and Models, IBFD. The US and Hong Kong do not have a comprehensive 
bilateral income tax treaty in place. 







Hong Kong takes a slightly different approach. Hong Kong operates a territorial corporate tax 
system that implies, if no reciprocal exemptions apply, both resident and non-resident are 
subject to tax on those shipping profits that are sourced in Hong Kong. According to the 
Hong Kong Inland Revenue Ordinance, shipping profits with source in Hong Kong are profits 
from the carriage of goods or persons aboard a ship at any location within the waters of 
Hong Kong. The law provides that the annual assessable profits are equal to the company’s 
worldwide net profits from shipping multiplied by the fraction of the gross shipping revenue 
sourced in Hong Kong, taken on the total of worldwide shipping revenue.22 Hong Kong thus 
incorporated into its domestic tax law what is generally known as the maritime formula (see 
section 3.2.2). Similar to Article 8B of the UN Model, the Hong Kong Inland Revenue 
Ordinance contains a safe harbour rule that applies (both in the figurative and literal 
meaning) if the non-resident shipping company’s ship called at any location within the waters 
of Hong Kong and this call was of a casual nature and further calls at any location in Hong 
Kong waters were improbable. If this is the case, the tax authorities might deem the 
enterprise not to be carrying on taxable shipping activities in Hong Kong.23  
 
Domestic source rules for non-resident shipping income are a standard feature of most 
income tax systems around the world, including countries in sub-Saharan Africa. In Nigeria, 
for instance, the Companies Income Tax Act contains rules that are similar to the ones 
applicable in Hong Kong, including the maritime formula. The Nigerian Companies Income 
Tax Act does not contain the casual-nature safe harbour, but it allows to revert to 
determination of the taxable base based on a fair percentage if the maritime formula cannot 
be applied satisfactorily. The percentage cannot be less than 2 per cent of the full sum 
receivable in respect of the carriage of passengers or goods shipped. Given that Nigeria has 
only sixteen bilateral tax treaties currently in force, seven of which provide for source taxation 
of shipping income, these domestic rules are far more relevant in Nigerian practice, than they 
are in countries with vast treaty networks providing for exclusive residence state taxation, like 
the US or Hong Kong.24  
 
3.2.2 International organisations’ (non-)efforts on shipping profits attribution rules 
 
This profit attribution issue is thus de facto solved by the application of domestic law rules in 
the source state. A great advantage for the latter is that it can apply the same set of rules 
across the board to whichever non-resident shipping company calls at its ports. This is not an 
unusual outcome for profit attribution rules. In the case of PEs or associated enterprises (i.e. 
transfer pricing), profit attribution rules are also not part of the bilateral treaty bargain. 
 
Contrary to PE profit attribution or transfer pricing, there has not been any effort to steer rules 
on shipping profit attribution towards international convergence. International shipping 
companies would obviously benefit from this convergence, given that it drastically facilitates 
compliance. Source states would also benefit, because convergence would lead to the 
formulation of best practice, which is easier to enforce because it usually draws on taxpayer 
feedback. 
 
The fact that the OECD has not developed guidance on this is not surprising, given that 
source taxation of international shipping profits is not included in the OECD Model. It is less 
obvious why the United Nations has not taken action. After initial deliberations regarding 
 
22  See Section 23B(3) and (12) of Cap. 112 of the Hong Kong Inland Revenue Ordinance, available at: 
https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/cap112?xpid=ID_1438402581828_002. 
23  See Section 23B(6) of Cap. 112 of the Hong Kong Inland Revenue Ordinance. 
24  For an illustration of recent Nigerian jurisprudence on the attribution of shipping profits to Nigeria derived by a French 
shipping company, see Nigeria: Tax Appeal Tribunal (Lagos Zone), 3 December 2020, No. AT/LZ/CIT/028/2017 






adoption of Article 8 (Alternative B) in the UN Model (1980), the UN Committee of Experts 
(CoE) has not yet revisited the outstanding issues regarding Article 8B, which include the 
lack of country guidance on appropriate net allocation rules. Besides the fact that the UN 
CoE has a tight agenda (which is mostly filled with responding to policy developments at the 
OECD), and lacks substantial support from a resourceful secretariat to develop its own 
policies, the reason for omission of the topic might be explained by its contentious nature. 
Developed country voices are usually well represented in the CoE, as are representatives of 
the international maritime transport sector. Both have few interests in common with regard to 
source taxation of shipping profits. Furthermore, many developing countries traditionally 
represented in the CoE have not embraced Article 8B in their tax treaty policies, and the 
perceived need to further this topic has not been present. This could, however, change in 
future CoE meetings. Current membership of the CoE (2021-2025) contains more members 
who represent countries that have embraced Article 8B in their tax treaty policies than the 
previous membership (2017-2020).25 This makes one believe that the time is ripe to put 
Article 8 (Alternative B) back on the CoE’s agenda. 
 
In addition to intergovernmental tax organisations, tax policy guidance and best practice are 
often also developed by relevant international professional organisations. In the field of 
maritime shipping, organisations like the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) have remained silent on the topic of Article 8B 
and its practical implementation issues. There is a clear benefit for international shipping 
business to see international convergence on the profit attribution rules. Arguably, the fear 
that streamlining these rules will convince more source countries to adopt source taxation is 
greater than the perceived benefit.   
 
This awkward spread between the need to have rules to employ source taxation in practice, 
and the principled stance against source taxation, is reflected in work by the International Air 
Transport Association (IATA) on the matter. Unlike its maritime transport counterparts, IATA 
does provide guidance to its members and to countries with regard to source taxation of (air 
transport) shipping profits. In its Guidelines for Taxation of International Air Transport Profits, 
IATA strongly recommends that countries grant reciprocal exemption of tax on international 
shipping income derived by non-residents, yet at the same time it concedes that some states 
are simply not willing to adopt the principle of reciprocal exemption of international transport 
earnings. IATA sets out a number of guidelines for calculation of the net income base in 
general, dealing with losses, and certain air transport specific concepts like flown revenue 
and the consequences of interline agreements and code sharing.  
 
Most relevant is IATA’s work on income apportionment formulas. In documentation for its 
member airlines, IATA refers to three generally accepted net income apportionment formulas 
– the maritime formula, Calcutta formula and Massachusetts formula. IATA reveals that using 
these income apportionment formulas is a practical solution for profit attribution to source 
states, both in the air transport and maritime shipping industry, and that use of the formulas 
is endorsed by countries like Canada, France, Myanmar, South Africa, Afghanistan and 
Australia (IATA 2018).26 In the previous section, it was shown that the maritime formula has 
 
25  The CoE usually has 25 members. The 2017-2020 CoE membership had 4 representatives from countries that had 
adopted 8B to some extent in their tax treaties (Nigeria, India, Vietnam and Thailand). The 2021-2025 CoE membership 
has 5 representatives of 8B countries (Pakistan, India, Nigeria, Indonesia, and Myanmar). It should be noted that, while 
nominated by their governments, Committee members serve in their personal capacity. See United Nations, ‘UN Tax 
Committee – 25 members appointed’, Secretary-General, 21 July 2021, available at: 
https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/personnel-appointments/2021-07-21/un-tax-committee-25-members-appointed.  
26  In a Practice Statement issued in 2008, Australian tax authorities confirmed that a non-treaty airline that calculated its 
Australian taxable income based on either the maritime formula or the Calcutta formula will have complied with 







been incorporated into domestic tax law provisions in Hong Kong and Nigeria to determine 
tax due on non-resident shipping profits. 
 
Only the maritime formula seems to have been tested by countries in relation to maritime 
shipping profits. This does not mean that the other two formulas do not represent a valid 
approach to profit attribution in the maritime shipping sector. 
 
1. Maritime formula 
 
The maritime formula is a single factor formula that has historically been used in the maritime 
shipping industry to measure source state income. It employs sales revenue as the basis for 
apportioning global net air transportation profit or loss of international enterprises. 
 
• ‘Revenue derived from Country X’ means gross revenue having its source in Country X; 
• ‘Global revenue’ means the total of international transport revenue appearing in the 
enterprise’s annual profit and loss accounts; 
• ‘Global net transport profit or loss’ means the profit or loss from operation of the 
international transport business, before income tax, as appearing in the enterprise’s 








Administration, PS LA 2008/2 (GA), available at: 







2. Calcutta formula 
 
 
Under the Calcutta formula, a profit and loss statement is prepared in which all expenses 
incurred to derive revenue in Country X are deducted from that revenue. 
 
• ‘Revenue derived from country X’ is identical to the parameter used in the ‘maritime 
formula’ and refers to the gross revenue having its source in Country X; 
• ‘Direct operating expenses in or related to Country X’ include all local costs, passenger 
services, local administrative costs, local distribution costs, advertisement costs etc.;  
• ‘Apportioned system expenses’ are all expenses other than direct operating expenses 
incurred in other countries. This item is apportioned according to the ratio of Country X’ 
revenue to the global revenue. 
 




The Massachusetts formula has its origins in apportionment of income between individual 
states in the US for the purpose of levying US state tax, and was also used in the EU 
Commission proposals for a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) for the 
attribution of multinational enterprise (MNE) profits between EU member states (European 
Commission 2016). It is a three-factor formula based on property, payroll and sales, giving 
weight to the dominant economic factors contributing to the enterprise’s net result.  
 
As may be gathered from the above formulas and examples, attributing shipping profits to a 
source state would not require rethinking the tax system, or a complex apportionment 
exercise like the one currently being debated for new taxing rights on digital services 
provided in a source state. IATA, the agency responsible for regulating air transport activities, 
has already gone through an exercise of considering apportionment formulas, gathering 






focus is on transport by air. Given the lack of support for source taxation in the maritime 
sector, it would now be up to the United Nations Tax Committee of Experts to borrow from 
IATA’s work and analyse which of the formulas is most suited to fill in the blanks left in Article 
8 (Alternative B), which merely refers to ‘an appropriate allocation of the over-all net profits’.  
 
3.3 Availability of information to the source state  
 
Another point of criticism often raised, both to reject source taxation of international shipping 
profits and to justify exclusive residence state taxation, is the fact that information needed for 
the source state to exercise its taxing right is simply unobtainable. If made obtainable by law, 
this requirement would be overly burdensome on multinationals engaged in international 
transport (Falcão 2020a: 1065; 2019).  
 
In the current ‘age of data’, any argument regarding the impracticality of obtaining data has 
lost much of its bite. Also, in the field of exchange of information and tax transparency, the 
world has changed dramatically since the inception of the OECD and UN Models. Recently, 
under OECD/G20 BEPS Action 13, a minimum standard was developed to require large 
MNEs to prepare country-by-country (CbC) reports with aggregate data on the global 
allocation of income, profit, taxes paid and economic activity among tax jurisdictions in which 
the MNE operates (OECD 2015c). Under the three-tiered CbCR system, MNEs prepare a 
master file and a CbC report, both to be submitted in the home country of the MNE, and a 
local file that is to be filed with the local tax authorities of each country in which the MNE in 
question is active by means of a constituent entity. A constituent entity is any separate 
business unit of an MNE that is included in the consolidated financial statements of the MNE 
Group for financial reporting purposes, and any such business unit that is excluded from the 
MNE group’s consolidated financial statements solely on size or materiality grounds.27 In the 
public consultation preceding the OECD’s final report on BEPS Action 13, IATA was keen to 
point out that, given the standard of exclusive residence taxation, CbCR was not very useful 
in the case of international transport businesses. The fact that airlines, for instance, pay no or 
little tax in source countries is due to applicable tax treaties, and not because of any base 
erosion and profit shifting. Without any PE or associated enterprise activity in these source 
countries, the purpose of BEPS Action 13 – the provision of data to enforce transfer pricing – 
becomes a moot point (IATA 2013).  
 
This seems to ignore the fact that certain countries have a clear tax treaty practice of 
preserving source state taxing rights. By its own admission, IATA emphasised that the 
exercise of these taxing rights should occur on a net income basis (see section 3.2.). The 
only way to properly determine the amount of net profits is by obtaining data from the 
transport business’ home country, and thus to subscribe to the CbCR regime. The OECD 
admits as much in its Final Report on BEPS Action 13 on the minimum standard of CbCR. At 
first sight, it seems that the OECD grants an exemption from CbCR reporting to the 
international transport business, even though special industry exemptions are generally 
deemed inappropriate. The reality is more complex. The Report provides that: ‘countries 
participating in the OECD/G20 BEPS Project agree that MNE groups with income derived 
from international transportation or transportation in inland waterways that is covered by 
treaty provisions that are specific to such income and under which the taxing rights on such 
income are allocated exclusively to one jurisdiction, should include the information required 
by the country-by-country template with respect to such income only against the name of the 
jurisdiction to which the relevant treaty provisions allocate these taxing rights’ (OECD 2015c: 
para 55). This seems to imply that, in the rare case in which the allocation does not happen 
 






exclusively to one jurisdiction, CbCR might be deemed necessary for the source state to 
exercise its sanctioned right to tax international shipping profits. 
 
4  Source taxation of shipping profits in tax 
treaty practice 
 
4.1 Introductory remarks 
 
This section surveys the extent to which Article 8 (Alternative B) of the UN Model has been 
used in global tax treaty practice. In addition to providing an overview of the global incidence 
of source taxation of shipping profits, the survey also aims to identify any individual countries 
that have embraced Article 8 (Alternative B) in their domestic tax treaty policy. The global 
survey is based on historic findings by other authors on the incidence of Article 8B. 
Compilation of the findings allows for creation of a time series of incidence.  
 
Next, a closer analysis is made of the relevant treaty provisions of these selected countries 
to identify model deviations and alterations. To the extent there is available relevant 
information, the interplay of Article 8B treaty practice and domestic tax law in these countries 
is analysed, including controversies regarding interpretation and application of the provision 
by the national courts. 
 
The purpose of the analysis is to draw up guidelines distilled from actual treaty practice that 
could assist countries contemplating the introduction of source taxation of shipping profits in 
their own tax treaties, in addition to guidance currently found in the UN Model. 
 
4.2 Global survey on source taxation of shipping profits in tax treaties 
 
In 2021, as part of the ICTD Tax Treaties Explorer, Martin Hearson and others compiled data 
on 2,275 comprehensive bilateral tax treaties concluded before 1 January 2020 by 118 non-
OECD countries (Hearson 2021). With regard to the incidence of Article 8 (Alternative B) of 
the UN Model, the data reveals the following. Out of 1,876 tested tax treaties in force on 1 
January 2020, 266 treaties grant taxing rights to source state with regard to profits from 
international transport by sea and/or air, equalling an incidence of 14 per cent. Prior studies 
on this topic by Wijnen and others led to similar findings, and also confirmed that Article 8B is 
very rarely included in tax treaties signed between two OECD countries.28 
 
The findings show that the incidence of source taxation of shipping profits in the bilateral tax 
treaty network is low. Compared to other UN Model provisions that deviate from the OECD 
Model, Article 8 (Alternative B) is one of the least adopted provisions in treaty practice, even 
though the provision has been included in the UN Model since its inception.29 The numbers 
 
28  See Wijnen and Magenta (1997: 574-585) and Wijnen and De Goede (2014: 128). The first study covered all 
comprehensive tax treaties signed between 1 January 1980 – the year in which the UN Model was released – up until 1 
April 1997. The global incidence of Article 8 (Alternative B) of the UN Model in the 811 treaties signed in that period was 
about 13%. The second study covers 1,811 comprehensive tax treaties signed between 1 January 1997 and 1 January 
2013. For the treaties signed in this period, the incidence of Article 8 (Alternative B) was about 6%. About half the 
treaties covered were signed between two OECD countries, and none of the treaties in this group included 8B. In the 
group of treaties in which one of the signatory states was a non-OECD country, the inclusion rate was about 12%. The 
studies also established that of all tax treaties concluded between OECD countries in the whole period from 1970 to 
2013, only three treaties contain a provision similar to Article 8B. 







seem to fuel the common understanding that Article 8B is an anomaly, and not part of what is 
generally considered sound tax treaty policy for a developing country. 
 
This conclusion is premature. First, Article 8 (Alternative B) of the UN Model is a unique 
model provision due to its specific scope – it applies to income from sea transport sourced in 
a country. It only speaks to developing countries with a certain geography – those that have 
a coastline. Of the 118 developing countries tested in ICTD’s Tax Treaties Explorer (2021), 
30 were land-locked countries without sea access.30 If the total of tested treaties is reduced 
by the same proportion, the total incidence of Article 8B rises to nearly 20 per cent, and 
closes in on the average level of incidence of other UN Model provisions. The historical 
analysis does show that the incidence of Article 8 (Alternative B) has remained more or less 
at a constant level since the inception of the UN Model in 1980. The expansion of the 
bilateral tax treaty network in the last decades, with developing countries signing more 
treaties, did not lead to an increased rate of adoption of source taxation on shipping profits in 
the new treaties. 
 
Secondly, and more importantly, the global survey results do not reflect the concentration of 
Article 8B in the tax treaty practice of individual countries. In other words, the numbers do not 
indicate whether 8B is included in a low number of treaties signed by many different 
countries, or in a high number of treaties signed by a few countries.  
 
Further analysis of the ICTD dataset reveals that the second hypothesis is true: the 
concentration of Article 8B is extremely high in a few countries. Of the 118 non-OECD 
countries covered in the dataset (88 of which are not land-locked), it appears that 8 countries 
are responsible for about 200 of the 266 treaties concluded by 1 or 2 developing countries 
that provide for source state taxation of shipping profits. In other words, the incidence of 
Article 8B in the treaties of those eight countries is extremely high, to the extent that it is safe 
to conclude that source taxation of shipping profits is a standard feature of their tax treaty 
practice. 
 
The eight countries – all located in South/South East Asia – are (in alphabetical order) 
Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Myanmar, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Thailand. 





30  Afghanistan; Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao PDR, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Moldova, Mongolia, Nepal, Niger, Paraguay, 
Rwanda, South Sudan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The complete list of 






Figure 1 Countries in South/South-East Asia that have implemented Article 8 
(Alternative B) of the UN model 
 
Source: Authors, created using https://mapchart.net/asia.html 
Figure 2 All bilateral tax treaties signed by countries in sub-Saharan Africa and 
South/South East Asia: treaties including Article 8 (Alternative A) in pink and Article 8 
(Alternative B) in green.  
 










4.3 Individual country survey on source taxation of shipping profits in tax 
treaties 
 
4.3.1 Introductory remarks 
 
The following sections provide a country overview of the policies pursued in eight 
South/South-East Asian countries that have adopted source state taxation of international 
transport profits in their treaties and domestic tax laws.  
 
A brief overview by country gives the degree of inclusion of Article 8B-type provisions in their 
tax treaties, and the historical evolution of including source taxation of international transport 
profits. Because not every treaty state is of economic significance with regard to the size of 
their mercantile fleet, a review is also provided of the inclusion of source taxation in treaties 
with the ten biggest ship-owning nations. It is assumed that whether a country is successful 
in applying its domestic tax laws providing for non-resident shipping income taxation, and 
effectively taxing the shipping industry doing business in its country, depends largely on 
whether the country is entitled to tax these profits at source under bilateral treaties with these 
ten nations. 
 
A brief summary is provided of the principal policy options pursued with regard to the four 
elements that constitute the taxing right under Article 8 (Alternative B) of the UN Model, as 
identified in section 3.1.3 – income covered, residence state taxing right, source state taxing 
right, and method of taxation. This overview provides a picture of the policy employed in 
countries that have adopted Alternative B of Article 8 as standard treaty policy. The overview 
is the result of an analysis of relevant provisions in more than 250 bilateral tax treaties signed 
by these 8 countries that include an Article 8B-type provision. 
 
Given that tax treaties only have a limiting force – they restrict the operation of domestic tax 
law on cross-border income for the purpose of avoiding double taxation, without creating tax 
liability – a quick overview is given of domestic tax law with regard to taxation of non-resident 
income and any relevant controversies settled in domestic jurisprudence with regard to 
interpretation and application of source state taxing rights on transport profits.  
 
In the last section, a synthesis table provides a clear overview. The purpose of the 
comparative analysis is to identify policy issues and solutions that need to be anticipated and 
carefully considered if a country considers implementing a similar policy of taxing transport 




a. General overview of tax treaty network 
 
Bangladesh currently has 34 comprehensive bilateral tax treaties in force, 31 of which 
provide for source taxation of international maritime shipping income, including 10 out of 13 
treaties signed in the last 20 years. The overall incidence of Article 8B-type provisions in 
Bangladesh tax treaties is 91 per cent. Of the 34 Bangladesh tax treaties, 17 are signed with 
OECD countries. Fifteen of these treaties provide for source taxation of maritime shipping 
income, equaling an incidence of 86 per cent. 
 
Bangladesh is party to one transport tax treaty, signed with Hong Kong in 2000, which 
provides for exclusive residence state taxation of air transport profits. Maritime shipping is 








Bangladesh is currently able to enforce source taxation on shipping profits in relation to nine 
out of the ten biggest ship-owning nations (see Table 2 in Section 4.3.10). Article 8B-type 
provisions are included in seven treaties: Denmark, Japan, China, US, Norway, Singapore 
and Korea (Dem. Rep.). The tax treaty with the UK expressly excludes shipping profits from 
the scope of the treaty, and no treaty is currently in force with Greece. The Bangladesh 
Germany Tax Treaty (1990) provided for a sunset clause for source state taxation that 
expired in 2000. 
 
b. Synthesis of tax treaty policy options pursued 
 
Bangladesh has not succeeded in preserving source state taxing rights on maritime shipping 
in only two (important) tax treaties – the Bangladesh Germany Tax Treaty (1991) and 
Bangladesh United States Tax Treaty (2004). The relevant provisions of the other 31 treaties 
preserving source state taxing rights can be summarised as follows. 
 
• Income covered. The international transport article in all relevant Bangladesh tax treaties 
allocates source state taxing rights on profits from international maritime transport. No 
taxing rights are allocated to the source state on profits from air transport. 
 
• Residence state taxing rights. The international transport article in most Bangladesh tax 
treaties refers to shipping enterprises of a contracting state. A small number of older 
treaties – all dating from before 2014 - refer to enterprises with their place of effective 
management (PoEM) in a contracting state.  
 
• Source state taxing rights. Nearly all Bangladesh treaties allocate source state taxing 
rights with regard to income covered that is ‘derived from the other state’. Only a few tax 
treaties refer to profits from ‘where the operation is carried on’. In three treaties – the 
Bangladesh Philippines Tax treaty (1997), the Bangladesh Canada (1982) Tax Treaty 
and the Bangladesh United Kingdom Tax Treaty (1979) – maritime transport is not 
covered in the international transport article and is expressly excluded from the business 
profits article. Under these treaties, the source state has unlimited taxing rights on these 
profits, based on a source rule to be determined by domestic law. None of the 
Bangladesh tax treaties contains an activity threshold (‘more than casual’ in Article 8B of 
the UN Model), meaning that the source country can tax any income that meets 
(domestic law interpretation of) the source rule criteria. 
 
• Method of taxation. All Bangladesh tax treaties provide that the tax charged in the source 
state shall be reduced by 50 per cent. In a small number of treaties, this tax, after the 
reduction of 50 per cent, shall not exceed 4 per cent, and in one treaty 2.5 per cent of 
gross receipts. Apart from treaties with a maximum ceiling of tax calculated on gross 
receipts, Bangladesh treaties do not determine whether tax in the source state is levied 
on gross or net profits. 
 
c. Interaction with domestic law 
 
Under Bangladesh domestic tax law, profits from international transport derived by a non-
resident enterprise are taxed on the gross amount. Section 56 of the Bangladesh Income 
Tax Ordinance (1986) provides that any person responsible for making a payment for air 
transport or water transport to a non-resident shall, unless such person is himself liable to tax 






on the amount payable at a rate of 7.5 per cent.31 Section 103A provides that non-resident 
operators of aircraft shall be taxable in the aggregate of receipts from the carriage of 
passengers, livestock, mail or goods loaded at any airport in Bangladesh into the aircraft. 
This income shall be deemed income from business or profession received in Bangladesh 




a. General overview of tax treaty network 
 
India currently has 103 comprehensive bilateral tax treaties in force, 17 of which provide for 
source taxation of international maritime shipping income, including 6 out of 45 treaties 
signed in the last 20 years. The overall incidence of Article 8B-type provisions in Indian tax 
treaties amounts to 17 per cent. Of the 103 Indian tax treaties, 35 are signed with OECD 
countries. Six of these treaties provide for source taxation of maritime shipping income – an 
incidence of 17 per cent. 
 
This might look like a relatively low percentage. However, the percentage does not reflect the 
fact that, from a historical point of view, India has one of the strongest traditions of source 
taxation of shipping income. Of the bilateral tax treaties signed between India’s 
independence in 1947 and 1980, 90 per cent provided for source taxation. As such, it is not 
surprising that India is said to have been one of the strong advocates for the insertion of 
Article 8 (Alternative B) in the UN Model (1980). Of all Indian treaties signed between 1980 
and 2000, 40 per cent provided for source taxation. For treaties signed between 2000 and 
2020, the inclusion rate dropped to about 16 per cent.33 From 1947 to 2013, India’s domestic 
mercantile fleet is said to have grown by a factor of 55.34 This transition from a shipping 
destination state to a shipowner state might explain India’s shift in tax treaty policy. It is 
unclear whether source taxation helped India to expand its domestic fleet. However, even 
without evidence of such a causality, it is clear that levying source tax on shipping profits did 
not prevent the growth of India’s domestic fleet, which is an important observation for 
developing countries contemplating including Alternative B in their tax treaties. The study of 
India’s tax treaties and domestic law remains highly relevant from a tax technical 
perspective. 
 
India is also party to 14 transport tax treaties. Most of these treaties only deal with airline 
transport profits, although some also cover maritime shipping profits. In all of these treaties 
exemption in the source state is granted on the basis of reciprocity, and taxing rights are 
exclusively allocated to the residence state. 
 
India is currently able to enforce source taxation on shipping profits under its tax treaties with 
only one of the ten biggest ship-owning nations – Greece (see Table 2 in Section 4.3.10). It 
has reciprocally agreed to exclusive residence (or PoEM) state taxation in its treaties with 
China (P.R.C.), Norway, Germany, Korea (Dem. Rep.), Singapore, the UK and the US. 
Sunset clauses providing source state taxation in treaties with Denmark and Japan have 
expired.  
 
31  Bangladesh: Income Tax Ordinance (1986, as amended in 2015), at section 56, available at: 
http://nbr.gov.bd/uploads/acts/25.pdf (last accessed: 1 January 2021). 
32  Bangladesh: Income Tax Ordinance (1986, as amended in 2015), at section 103A, available at: 
http://nbr.gov.bd/uploads/acts/25.pdf (last accessed: 1 January 2021). 
 
33  The historic inclusion rates are based on the data compiled and visualised by ICTD’s Tax Treaties Explorer (2021), 
available at: https://www.treaties.tax (last accessed: 15 March 2021). 
34  India (2013), Government of India – Ministry of Transport, Indian Shipping Statistics 2013, at p. 7, available at: 






b. Synthesis of tax treaty policy options pursued 
 
Relevant provisions of the 17 Indian tax treaties that provide source state taxing rights on 
international shipping profits can be summarised as follows. 
 
• Income covered. The international transport article in all but one tax treaty allocates 
source state taxing rights on profits from international maritime transport. The tax treaty 
with the Philippines allocates source state taxing rights also on profits from air transport. 
 
• Residence state taxing rights. With two exceptions, all relevant tax treaties apply the 
international transport article to ‘resident of a state’. The India Kenya Tax Treaty (2016) is 
a rare example of a recent treaty using the ‘old’ rule of place of effective management 
(PoEM). 
 
• Source state taxing rights. A variety of different source rules are used. A number of 
treaties apply source state taxing rights to ‘profits from the operation within the other 
state’. A few treaties employ a more restrictive rule and only apply to ‘profits from the 
operation of ships between the ports of the source state and the ports of third countries’. 
Other treaties do not contain a restrictive sourcing rule or apply to ‘profits derived from 
the other state’ or ‘profits from sources in the other state’. The India Switzerland Tax 
Treaty (1994) does not include maritime transport in the transport article, and expressly 
excludes profits derived thereof from the business profits article. This implies the source 
state had unlimited taxing rights on said income. A few treaties only grant source state 
taxing rights to domestic transport in the source state. None of the Indian tax treaties with 
source state taxing rights currently contains an activity threshold (‘more than casual’ in 
Article 8B of the UN Model), meaning that the source country can tax any income that 
meets (domestic law interpretation of) the source rule criteria. The activity threshold was 
included in a number of treaties for which a sunset clause (i.e. source state taxation only 
for the first ten years of application of the treaty) has reverted the treaty back to exclusive 
residence state taxation. 
 
• Method of taxation. All treaties provide for a reduction of tax in the source state between 
40 per cent and 66 per cent, and in most treaties 50 per cent. No limit is provided on the 
source state taxing rights when they are restricted to domestic transport, or domestic 
transport between the source state and a third country.  
 
c. Interaction with domestic law 
 
Under the Indian Income Tax Act (1961), the taxable profit of a non-resident shipping or air 
transport business is deemed to be a certain percentage of its gross receipts. Section 44B 
(entitled non-resident shipping business) and section 172 (entitled occasional non-resident 
shipping business) of the ITA provides that this percentage is 7.5 per cent for international 
maritime shipping. Section 44BBA determines that this percentage is 5 per cent for 
international transport by air. Gross receipts are deemed to be the aggregate of any fare or 
freight paid or payable, whether in India or outside India, for the carriage of passengers, 
livestock, mail or goods transported from any port or place in India (outbound transport); and 
any fare or freight received or deemed to be received in India for the carriage of passengers, 
livestock, mail or goods shipped from any port or place outside India (inbound transport). 
Gross receipts also include demurrage charge, handling charge or similar payments.35 The 
taxable income is taxed at the rates applicable to foreign companies – 40 per cent. The 
effective tax rate on gross receipts is thus 3 per cent in case of maritime transport and 2 per 
 
35  India: Income Tax Act (1961), as amended by Finance Act (2020), available at: 






cent in case of air transport. The non-resident taxpayer is allowed to opt to be taxed under 
the normal regime. In this case, the tax paid under the system of presumptive taxation is 
considered an advanced payment of tax. 
 
About 95 per cent of India’s foreign trade by volume, and about 70 per cent of its trade by 
value, currently occurs through international shipping. This has resulted in an abundant body 
of jurisprudence in which the courts in India consider the scope of the international transport 
article that mostly provides for exclusive taxation in the residence state (i.e. not India) and 
other articles (like Article 7 (business profits), Article 12A (fees for technical services) or 
Article 21 (other income) that grant India taxing rights as the source state. Jurisprudence with 
regard to the scope of the source state taxing rights under treaties with 8B-type provisions is 
rare. In a decision rendered in 2004 by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) of Mumbai, 
it was held that the transport activities of a Dutch maritime shipping company that owned 
three ships, one of which had called at ports in India once during the relevant tax year, 1996, 
and two of which had called at ports in India six times during the year, were more than casual 
for the purpose of Article 8A(2) of the India Netherlands Tax Treaty.36 This Treaty is one of 
the rare tax treaties with an activity threshold for source state taxing rights, modelled on 
Article 8B of the UN Model. The provision contains a sunset clause, and was only applicable 
for the first ten years for which the Treaty had effect – until 1998. Currently, air and maritime 





a. General overview of tax treaty network 
 
Indonesia currently has 70 comprehensive bilateral tax treaties in force, 21 of which provide 
for source taxation of international maritime shipping income, including 10 out of 13 treaties 
signed in the last 20 years. The overall incidence of Article 8B-type provisions in Indonesian 
tax treaties amounts to 30 per cent. Of the 70 Indonesian tax treaties, 27 are signed with 
OECD countries. Five of these treaties provide for source taxation of maritime shipping 
income, equalling an incidence of 19 per cent. 
 
Indonesia is currently able to enforce source taxation on shipping profits under its tax treaty 
with only two out of the ten biggest ship-owning nations (see Table 2 in Section 4.3.10) – 
China and Singapore. No treaty has been signed with Greece. Source taxation is excluded in 
the treaties with Denmark, Germany, Japan, Korea (Dem. Rep.) Norway, the UK and the US. 
 
b. Synthesis of policy options pursued. 
 
The relevant provisions of the 21 Indonesian tax treaties that provide source state taxing 
rights on international shipping profits can be summarised as follows. 
 
• Income covered. The international transport article in all relevant Indonesian tax treaties 
allocates source state taxing rights on profits from international maritime transport. In four 
tax treaties currently in force, source state taxing rights are also allocated for air 





36  India: Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) Mumbai, 28 May 2004, James Mackintosh & Co. (P.) Ltd. V ACIT, Tax 






• Residence state taxing rights. With one exception, all relevant tax treaties apply the 
international transport article to ‘resident of a state’. The Indonesia India Tax Treaty 
(2012) refers to place of effective management (PoEM). 
 
• Source state taxing rights. A small majority of Indonesian tax treaties allocate source 
state taxing rights with regard to income ‘from sources within the other state’. A few tax 
treaties do not contain a source rule, and a small number of treaties contain a more 
specific rule that only catches income from the place ‘where the transport operation is 
carried on’. None of the Indonesian tax treaties contains an activity threshold (‘more than 
casual’ in Article 8B of the UN Model), meaning that the source country can tax any 
income that meets (domestic law interpretation of) the source rule criteria. 
 
• Method of taxation. Nearly all Indonesian tax treaties provide that the tax charged in the 
source state shall be reduced by 50 per cent. In a small number of treaties, and mostly 
those restricting the source state taxing rights to domestic transport, there is no limit. The 
Indonesia Qatar Tax Treaty (2006) is an example of a recent treaty that goes all out, with 
source state taxing rights on maritime and air transport income derived from sources in 
the source state, in which the income can be taxed in said state without any limits.  
 
c. Interaction with domestic law 
 
Article 15 of Indonesian Income Tax Law (1983) provides that foreign shipping and airline 
operations, namely the transportation of people or goods from a port in Indonesia to an 
overseas port, are taxed at a rate of 2.4 per cent on the gross profits. Inbound transport is 
not subject to tax. The rate is derived by assuming a 6 per cent net profit on the gross 
turnover that is taxed at the current ordinary corporate tax rate of 25 per cent (i.e. 1.5%) and 
adding the branch tax of 20 per cent that is due on the assumed 6 per cent net rate after the 
levying of the corporate tax of 25 per cent (i.e. 0.9%).37 Under the deemed profit and final tax 
regime, all costs and depreciation incurred by the transport companies are ignored. A foreign 
shipping company providing sea transport to and from ports in Indonesia is required to 
appoint a local shipping company as a general agent in Indonesia. Non-shipping income 
generated in Indonesia by non-resident transport companies is subject to the ordinary 
corporate tax rate of 25 per cent. In such cases, relevant costs not related to vessels are 
deductible. 
 
Article 26 of the Income Tax Law (1983) provides that resident taxpayers are required to 
withhold tax at a rate of 20 per cent on payments for the provision of services provided by 
non-residents. Non-resident transport companies doing business in Indonesia and which are 
not deemed to have a PE in the form of a representative agent are subject to the 20 per cent 
withholding tax on gross income instead of the tax levied at the rate of 2.4 per cent. 
 
In the past, the Indonesian tax authorities have usually been quick to confirm the existence of 
a PE of foreign shipping companies, by looking at the PE provisions in the relevant tax 
treaties. This is much to the benefit of the foreign providers, given the disparity between the 
rate of 2.4 per cent compared to 20 per cent in case of the absence of a PE. In recent years, 
tax authorities have been more reluctant to grant access to the benefits of Article 8 of the 
relevant tax treaties and the domestic low-rate tax regime. For example, in Zinkpower Batam, 
a decision by the Indonesian Tax Court issued in 2019, the Court sided with the taxpayer to 
 
37  See Indonesia: Income Tax Law Number 7 (1986), articles 15 and 26, available at: https://www.pajak.go.id/id/pph-pasal-
15 (last accessed: 1 January 2021), and Indonesia: Minister of Finance Decree, 416/KMK.04/1996, 14 June 1996, 
available at: https://jdih.kemenkeu.go.id/fulltext/1996/416~KMK.04~1996Kep.htm (last accessed: 1 January 2021); 
Indonesia: Minister of Finance Decree, 417/KMK.04/1996, 14 June 1996, available at: 






confirm that transport by a Singaporean shipping company of zinc products between a zinc 
processing plant in Indonesia and a customer in Singapore fell within the scope of Article 
8(2) of the Indonesia Singapore Tax Treaty (1986), and that the Indonesian tax rate thus had 
to be reduced by 50 per cent. The Court confirmed however that the services were taxed at 
20 per cent (reduced to 10%), given the lack of a PE in Indonesia.38 In Eastern Navigation 
and Star Global Shipping, the Tax Court went even further by deciding that the charter 
payments made to two Singaporean shipping companies for shipping a fully equipped coal 
transport vessel for transport of coal between Indonesia and Singapore were subject to tax at 
the beneficial rate on foreign shipping income, even if the existence of a PE had not been 
confirmed. The Court concluded that the signing of a local agent was a regulatory 
requirement to do business in Indonesia, but nowhere in the tax treaty had it been confirmed 




a. General overview of tax treaty network 
 
Myanmar currently has eight comprehensive bilateral tax treaties in force, all of which 
provide for source taxation of international maritime shipping income. Its tax treaty with 
Korea (Dem. Rep.) is the only treaty signed with an OECD country and/or with a country 
listed in the top ten of biggest ship-owning nations (see Table 2 in Section 4.3.10) that 
provides for source taxation. Given that Myanmar has no tax treaty in place with any of the 
nine other big ship-owning nations (or any other country), the country is able to exercise its 
domestic law, taxing non-resident shipping income without any treaty-induced restrictions. 
 
b. Synthesis of policy options pursued 
 
The international transport provisions in Myanmar tax treaties can be summarised as follows: 
 
• Income covered. The articles only apply to maritime shipping profits. 
 
• Residence state taxing rights. The international transport articles apply the international 
maritime transport carried on by a ‘resident of a state’. 
 
• Source state taxing rights. Six treaties refer to ‘income derived from the other state’. Two 
treaties refer to ‘income from sources within the other state’. None of the relevant tax 
treaties contains an activity threshold (‘more than casual’ in Article 8B of the UN Model), 
meaning that the source country can tax any income that meets (domestic law 
interpretation of) the source rule criteria. 
 
• Method of taxation. All treaties provide for a 50 per cent reduction of the tax levied in the 




38  Indonesia: Tax Court, 28 January 2019, No. PUT-080089.13, Zinkpower Batam, Tax Treaty Case Law IBFD. 
39  Indonesia: Tax Court, 2 May 2018, No. PUT-101515.35 and PUT-C / 2013 / PP / M.XVB 2018, Eastern Navigation and 
Star Global Shipping, Tax Treaty Case Law IBFD. This decision contradicts a prior decision by the Tax Court of 2017 in 
which the Court had confirmed the tax authorities’ requirement of the existence of a PE, see: Indonesia: Tax Court, 28 
February 2017, No. PUT-81526 / PP / M.IIIA / 13/2017, AAA Shipping, BBB Floating Dock and BBB Offshore 
Enterprises, Tax Treaty Case Law IBFD. In a decision rendered in 2014, the Tax Court held that similar chartering fees 
were subject to a withholding tax of 20%, the general rate for services provided by foreign providers, thereby implicitly 
confirming that the charter fees were outside the scope of Article 8 and in the scope of Article 21 (‘other income’ of the 
Singapore Indonesia Tax Treaty. See: Indonesia, Tax Court, 17 December 2014, No. PUT-58605 / PP / M.VIB / 










a. General overview of tax treaty network 
 
Pakistan currently has 66 comprehensive bilateral tax treaties in force, 28 of which provide 
for source taxation of international maritime shipping income, including 8 out of 25 treaties 
signed in the last 20 years. The overall incidence of Article 8B-type provisions in Pakistani 
tax treaties amounts to 42 per cent. Of the 66 Pakistani tax treaties, 23 are signed with 
OECD countries. Ten of these treaties provide for source taxation of maritime shipping 
income, equalling an incidence of 43 per cent. 
 
Pakistan is currently able to enforce source taxation on shipping profits under its tax treaty 
with six of the ten biggest ship-owning nations (see Table 2 in Section 4.3.10). Article 8B-
type provisions are included in the treaties with Denmark, Korea (Dem. Rep.), Singapore, 
Norway and the US. No treaty has been signed with Greece. Source taxation is excluded in 
the treaties with China (P.R.C.), Germany, Japan and the UK. 
 
b. Synthesis of tax treaty policy options pursued 
 
The policy options pursued by Pakistan in its 28 tax treaties providing for source state 
taxation of international shipping profits can be summarised as follows: 
 
• Income covered. In most Pakistani tax treaties providing source state taxing rights, these 
are restricted to international maritime transport profits. In about one in three tax treaties, 
the source state taxing rights cover profits from both maritime and air transport. 
 
• Residence state taxing rights. With the exception of three tax treaties, all relevant tax 
treaties apply the international transport article to ‘resident of a state’. 
 
• Source state taxing rights. The majority of tax treaties apply source state taxing rights to 
income ‘derived from sources within the other state’. Only a few treaties refer to income 
‘from the operation of international transport in the other state’. A few treaties restrict 
source state taxing rights to profits from local transport and/or domestic container use. 
None of the Pakistani tax treaties contain an activity threshold (‘more than casual’ in 
Article 8B of the UN Model), meaning that the source country can tax any income that 
meets (domestic law interpretation of) the source rule criteria. 
 
• Method of taxation. Nearly all Pakistani tax treaties provide that the tax charged in the 
source state shall be reduced by 50 per cent. In a small number of treaties, and mostly 
those restricting source state taxing rights to domestic transport or domestic container 
use, there is no limit. Three treaties add to the 50 per cent reduction of tax an alternative 
maximum threshold of between 1 and 4 per cent of gross receipts, implying taxation on 
gross basis. 
 
• Interaction with domestic law. Since the 1980s, Pakistan taxes income from international 
shipping under its domestic tax law. The Pakistani approach is said to have been 
adopted as a result of similar policy developments in other countries in the region like 
India, Thailand and the Philippines (Ahmed 2020: 113). Section 7 of the Pakistani Income 
Tax Ordinance (2001) provides that every non-resident person carrying on the business 








a. The gross amount received or receivable (whether in or out of Pakistan) for the carriage 
of passengers, livestock, mail or goods embarked in Pakistan; and 
b. The gross amount received or receivable in Pakistan for the carriage of passengers, 
livestock, mail or goods embarked outside Pakistan. 
 
The amount of tax due by the non-resident is calculated by applying the applicable rate on 
the gross amounts received. Division V of the First Schedule of the Income Tax Ordinance 
(2001) stipulates that the rate on maritime shipping income is 8 per cent of the gross amount 
received or receivable and 3 per cent in the case of air transport.40 
 
In A.P. Moller through Maersk Pakistan, a case decided by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in 
2012, the highest court confirmed that the Pakistan Denmark Tax Treaty – which allows the 
source state to tax international maritime shipping profits derived from sources within – does 
not prevent Pakistan, as the source state, to tax receipts for both inbound and outbound 
transport. In casu, it was confirmed that the freight receipts by the Danish enterprise for 
cargo transported to Pakistan on ‘free on board’ (FOB) basis, paid in Pakistan by the resident 
buyers of the goods, had their source in Pakistan for the purpose of the treaty and domestic 
law and were thus subject to tax in Pakistan.41 
 
4.3.7 The Philippines 
 
a. General overview of tax treaty network 
 
The Philippines currently has 43 comprehensive bilateral tax treaties in force, all of which 
provide for source taxation of international maritime and air shipping income, including all 14 
treaties signed in the last 20 years. The overall incidence of Article 8B-type provisions in 
Philippine tax treaties amounts to 100 per cent. Of the 43 Philippine tax treaties, 25 are 
signed with OECD countries. All these treaties provide for source taxation of maritime and air 
shipping income. 
 
The Philippines is currently able to enforce source taxation on shipping profits in relation to 
all the 10 biggest ship-owning nations (see Table 2 in Section 4.3.10). Article 8B-type 
provisions are included in the treaties with China (P.R.C.), Germany, Denmark, Japan, Korea 
(Dem. Rep.), Norway, Singapore, the UK and the US. No treaty has been signed with 
Greece.  
 
b. Synthesis of treaty policy options pursued 
 
Based on an analysis of the provisions providing source state taxation of international 
shipping income in 43 Philippine tax treaties, the following conclusions can be drawn with 
regard to the key policy options: 
 
• Income covered. Unlike in Article 8 (Alternative B) of the UN Model, the international 
transport article in all relevant Philippine tax treaties allocates source state taxing rights 
both in relation to international maritime transport and air transport.  
 
• Residence state taxing rights. The international transport article in most Philippine tax 
treaties refers to shipping enterprises of a contracting state. A small number of older 
 
40  Pakistan: Income Tax Ordinance (2001), as amended up to 30 June 2020, available at: 
https://www.fbr.gov.pk/Categ/Income-Tax-Ordinance/326 (last accessed: 1 January 2021). 
41  Pakistan: Supreme Court, 24 January 2012, No. 2012 S C M R 557, A.P. MOLLER through Maersk Pakistan, Tax 






treaties – all dating from before 2014 - refer to enterprises with their place of effective 
management (PoEM) in a contracting state.  
 
• Source state taxing rights. Nearly all Philippine treaties allocate source state taxing rights 
with regard to income covered that is derived ‘from sources within the other state’ or 
profits ‘arising in the other state’. A small number of treaties contain a definition of the 
income covered under the source rule.42 A small number of treaties do not contain a 
source rule. Three treaties do not contain an article dedicated to international transport 
profits. In these treaties the ordinary PE rule applies. None of the Philippine treaties 
contains an activity threshold (‘more than casual’ in Article 8B of the UN Model), meaning 
that the source country can tax any income that meets (domestic law interpretation of) 
the source rule criteria. 
 
• Method of taxation. Nearly all Philippine treaties provide that tax charged in the source 
state shall not exceed 1.5 per cent of the gross revenue derived from sources in said 
country. In a small number of treaties, the absolute cap is replaced by a relative 
deduction of 40 per cent. All treaties contain a most-favoured nation (MFN) clause 
providing that the tax levied in the source state (the Philippines or the other state) shall 
not exceed the lowest rate of Philippine tax that may be imposed on the relevant profits 
derived by a resident of a third state. At the time of writing, the MFN clause seems not to 
have been triggered: 1.5 per cent of gross tax, which equals a 40 per cent reduction of 
the domestic law rate of 2.5 per cent, seems the universal lowest standard in all 
Philippine treaties currently in force. Unlike for maritime shipping, in a select few older 
treaties, there is no similar limit on source state taxing rights on international air transport 
profits. 
 
c. Interaction with domestic law 
 
The Philippines’ tax treaty policy is concomitant with the country’s strong tradition in its 
domestic law of taxing non-resident profits from international transport sourced in the 
Philippines, both from air and maritime transport. 
 
Under Section 28(A)(3) of the Philippine National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 (NIRC 
(1997)), foreign international air and ship carriers are subject to a tax of 2.5 per cent on their 
‘gross Philippine billings’ (GPB). For international shipping carriers, GPB is defined as gross 
revenue, whether for passengers, cargo or mail originating from the Philippines up to the 
destination, regardless of the place of issue or payment of the passage ticket of freight 
document. The 2.5 per cent rate applied on gross billings is said to be determined by 
assuming a 90 per cent ratio of deductions to a carrier’s Philippine gross income and the 
application of the (old) 25 per cent rate of corporate income tax on the assumed 10 per cent 
of net income.43 
 
42  See Philippines Netherlands Tax Treaty (1989), article. 8(3), which stipulates that: ‘profits derived from the other State 
mean profits as determined under its domestic law realised from the carriage of passengers, excess baggage, mail, 
livestock or goods boarded or loaded in that other State by a shipping enterprise doing business in that State of 
passage documents sold therein or from uplifts anywhere in the world by an international carrier doing business in that 
other State of passage documents sold therein, provided that in such cases the mail, livestock or goods originate from 
that other State. Profits realised from the carriage of passengers, excess baggage, mail, livestock or goods which are 
brought to that other State solely for transhipments, or for transfer from one aircraft to another or from an aircraft to a 
ship or from a ship to an aircraft shall not be included. Profits from chartered flights originating from that other State shall 
be deemed to be derived from that State regardless of the place of sale of the passage documents. For purposes of 
determining the taxability of profits from chartered flights, the term ‘originating from that other State’ shall include flights 
of passengers who stay in that other State for more than 48 hours prior to embarkation’. 
43  Prior to the introduction of the 2.5% rate applied on gross income in 1972, tax was levied on net income from Philippine 
sources at the ordinary corporate tax rate. This system was abolished due to problems concerning allocation of income 
and deductions, mostly due to lack of information regarding the carriers’ taxable profits in the residence state. The 






In Association of International Shipping Lines and Maersk, a case decided in February 2020, 
the Philippine Supreme Court confirmed that demurrage fees and detention fees do not form 
part of GPB that are subject to 2.5 per cent under Section 28. Demurrage fees are 
compensation paid to the owner of a vessel by the charterer who remained in possession of 
the vessel after the contractual period normally allowed to load and unload cargo. Detention 
fees are charged when a container has not been returned by the consignee to the container 
owner within the allotted time. The Court confirmed that these payments derived by non-
resident shipping companies fall under section 28(A)(1) of the NIRC (1997) and, like any 
ordinary income derived from sources within the Philippines, they are subject to a tax of 30 
per cent on net income (or 15% on gross income).44 
 
The Supreme Court’s decision does not deal with the issue of qualification of demurrage and 
detention fees for the purpose of Philippine tax treaties. It is largely undisputed that this 
income, derived in relation to charter and container rental activities, is income ‘from the 
operation of ships or aircraft in international traffic’ for the purpose of the Treaty if the 
activities are directly connected or ancillary to the shipping activities.45 The Philippine tax 
treaties typically grant the source country taxing rights to tax this income, but without 
charging a tax that is higher than 1.5 per cent of the gross revenue derived from the source 
state. It is difficult to envision how this treaty restriction on gross income is to apply on 
income like demurrage and detention fees, which is subject on a net basis under domestic 
law.  
 
From a policy perspective, it might be concluded that, instead of inserting an absolute 
reduction of tax in the source state, it is better to agree on a reduction expressed in a relative 
amount. For instance, if the 40 per cent reduction of tax would allow income within GPB to be 
taxed at the rate of 1.5 per cent instead of the domestic rate of 2.5 per cent. The other 
income within the scope of Article 8 would be taxed at a rate of 18 per cent instead of 30 per 
cent on net income. 
 
Finally, it should be mentioned that before Revenue Regulation No. 15-2002 was issued in 
2002,46 gross billings by local agents selling tickets in the Philippines for flights operated 
entirely in third countries by off-line carriers without landing rights in the Philippines was 
nevertheless considered shipping income from sources within the Philippines and thus 
subject to the tax on GPB, even if the airline in question never physically embarked 
passengers in the Philippines. In Air New Zealand, a decision rendered in 2006 with regard 
to tax year 2000, the Court confirmed that levying the tax was compatible with Article 8 of the 
relevant tax treaties.47 These tax treaties refer to ‘profits from sources within a contracting 
state’, and arguably, selling tickets is a source of profits, even if the transport activities take 
place in other countries. From a policy perspective, this shows that drafting a precise 
sourcing rule is critical. Source taxation of shipping income should only apply to income from 
shipping activities taking place in the source state, irrespective of the place where tickets are 





44  Philippines: Supreme Court, 15 January 2020, No. 222239, Association of International Shipping Lines Inc. and Maersk-
Filipinas Inc. v Secretary of Finance, Tax Treaty Case Law IBFD. 
45  See Article 8 of the UN Model (2017), para. 10(2) 
46  See Philippines: Department of Finance, Revenue Regulations No. 15-2002, 30 May 2002, at Section 3, available at: 
https://www.bir.gov.ph/images/bir_files/old_files/pdf/2031rr15_02.pdf (last accessed: 1 January 2021). 
47  Philippines: Supreme Court, 28 June 2007, No. C.T.A. 6657, Air New Zealand v Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Tax 






4.3.8 Sri Lanka 
 
a. General overview of tax treaty network 
 
Sri Lanka currently has 47 comprehensive bilateral tax treaties in force, 46 of which provide 
for source taxation of international maritime shipping income, including all 15 treaties signed 
in the last 20 years. The overall incidence of Article 8B-type provisions in Sri Lankan tax 
treaties amounts to 98 per cent. Of the 47 Sri Lankan tax treaties, 20 were signed with 
OECD countries. Nineteen of these treaties provide for source taxation of maritime shipping 
income, equalling an incidence of 95 per cent. 
 
Sri Lanka is also part of four bilateral transport tax treaties. All these treaties allow for 
exclusive residence state taxation of air transport income. The Sri Lanka Hong Kong 
Transport Tax Treaty (2004) stands out because it is the only one of its kind also dealing with 
maritime shipping profits, and Hong Kong is an important ship-owning nation. Under the 
Treaty, the source state is entitled to tax maritime profits from the operations in its territory.48 
 
Sri Lanka is currently able to enforce source taxation on shipping profits under its tax treaty 
with nine of the ten biggest ship-owning nations (see Table 2 in Section 4.3.10). Article 8B-
type provisions are included in the treaties with China (P.R.C.), Denmark, Germany, Japan, 
Korea (Dem. Rep.), Norway, Singapore and the US. No treaty has been signed with Greece. 
Source taxation is excluded in the treaties with the UK. 
 
b. Synthesis of policy options pursued 
 
The relevant provisions in the 45 Sri Lankan tax treaties that provide source state taxing 
rights can be summarised as follows: 
 
• Income covered. Except for the treaty with Bangladesh (1986) and Japan (1967), Sri 
Lankan treaties only provide source state taxing rights to maritime shipping profits. 
 
• Residence state taxing rights. Except for a few older treaties that refer to the PoEM, Sri 
Lankan treaties apply to international maritime transport carried on by a ‘resident of a 
state’. 
 
• Source state taxing rights. A majority of the treaties provide taxing rights in relation to 
income ‘from the state where the operation is carried on’. In recent treaties, a broader 
sourcing rule is applied that refers to income ‘derived in the other state’. None of the Sri 
Lankan treaties contains an activity threshold (‘more than casual’ in Article 8B of the UN 
Model), meaning that the source country can tax any income that meets (domestic law 
interpretation of) the source rule criteria. 
 
• Method of taxation. All treaties provide for a 50 per cent reduction of the tax levied in the 
source state. No indication is provided whether this tax is to be levied on a gross or on a 
net basis. In a number of older treaties it is provided that, in any case, the tax cannot 
exceed between 2 and 6 per cent of gross receipts. This implies the envisioned method 










c. Interaction with domestic law 
 
Section 73 of the Inland Revenue Act (2017) of Sri Lanka provides that payments received 
by a person who conducts a relevant transport business in respect of the carriage of 
passengers who embark or cargo, mail or other moveable tangible assets that are embarked 
in Sri Lanka, other than as a result of trans-shipment, or the rental of containers and related 
equipment which are supplementary or incidental to the carriage are deemed to have their 
source in Sri Lanka. Section 85 provides that if these payments are made by companies and 
persons carrying out a business to non-resident persons, they are subject to a withholding 
tax.49 The tax is levied at a rate of 2 per cent on the gross receipts. The withholding tax is 
final, unless the non-resident has a PE in Sri Lanka for the purpose of Sri Lankan domestic 
tax law. If a PE exists, profits and losses are to be attributed as if the PE was a separate 





a. General overview of tax treaty network 
 
Thailand currently has 61 comprehensive bilateral tax treaties in force, 58 of which provide 
for source taxation of international maritime shipping income, including 23 of the 25 tax 
treaties signed in the last 20 years. The incidence of Article 8B-type provisions in Thai tax 
treaties amounts to 95 per cent. Of the 61 Thai tax treaties, 29 are signed with OECD 
countries. Twenty-five of these treaties provide for source taxation of maritime shipping 
income, equalling an incidence of 86 per cent. 
 
Thailand is currently able to enforce source taxation on shipping profits in relation to all ten 
biggest ship-owning nations (see Table 2 in Section 4.3.10). Article 8B-type provisions are 
included in eight treaties (Japan, China, US, Norway, Singapore, Germany and Korea (Dem. 
Rep.). The tax treaty with the UK expressly excludes shipping profits from the scope of the 
treaty which implies that source taxation is possible according to the general permanent 
establishment rule, and no treaty is currently in force with Greece. 
 
b. Synthesis of treaty policy options pursued 
 
Based on an analysis of the provisions providing source state taxation of international 
shipping income in 58 Thai tax treaties, the following conclusions can be drawn with regard 
to the key policy options: 
 
• Income covered. Nearly all Thai treaties with an 8B-type of provision allocate source 
state taxing rights only on profits from international transport by sea. Air transport profits 
are exclusively taxable in the residence state. One exception is the Thailand Philippines 
Tax Treaty (2013), which also applies source taxation to air transport. The most recent 
Thai tax treaty extends the source state taxing rights to encompass income from 




49  Sri Lanka: Inland Revenue Act., No. 24 of 2017, available at: 
http://www.ird.gov.lk/en/publications/Acts_Income%20Tax_2017/IR_Act_No._24_2017_E.pdf (last accessed: 1 January 
2021). 
50  Sri Lanka: Manual of Inland Revenue Act, No. 24 of 2017, at section 12.1.4, available at: 
http://www.ird.gov.lk/en/publications/Acts_Income%20Tax_2017/Guide%20to%20Inland%20Revenue%20Act.pdf (last 






• Residence state taxing rights. The international transport article in most Philippine tax 
treaties refers to shipping enterprises of a contracting state. Only the Thailand France 
Tax Treaty (1974) employs the PoEM criterion. The most recently signed treaty, the 
Thailand Cambodia Tax Treaty (2017), uses place of incorporation as the nexus rule.  
 
• Source state taxing rights. Most recent Thai treaties refer to ‘income from the operation of 
international traffic in the other state’. However, a large majority of the treaties do not 
contain a sourcing rule. Under these treaties, whether or not income is covered by the 
source state taxing right depends solely on the domestic tax law of the source state, and 
can, for instance, cover income from transport in the state but also income from local 
ticket sales of transport taking place solely in third countries. A few older tax treaties 
provide that the source state is entitled to tax the income, if the transport enterprise 
meets the PE threshold in the source state.51 None of the Thai treaties contains an 
activity threshold (‘more than casual’ in Article 8B of the UN Model), meaning that the 
source country can tax any income that meets (domestic law interpretation of) the source 
rule criteria. 
 
• Method of taxation. Except for the treaty with the Philippines which also includes the 
Philippine 1.5 per cent limit on gross shipping income, all Thai treaties stipulate that the 
tax levied in the source state is to be reduced by 50 per cent. 
 
c. Interaction with domestic law 
 
Section 66 of the Revenue Code of Thailand stipulates that foreign companies are subject to 
tax in Thailand on the net profits from the business carried on in Thailand. Section 67 
provides that foreign companies carrying on an international transportation business shall be 
taxed as follows: 
 
1. In the case of carriage of passengers, 3 per cent of tax is due on the fares, fees and 
other benefits chargeable in Thailand, deducting any expense from such carriage of 
passengers; 
2. In the case of carriage of goods, 3 per cent of tax is due on the freight charges, fees and 
other benefits, whether chargeable in Thailand or not, before deducting any expense 
from such carriage of goods. 
 
Section 67 establishes that an international transport company is a company that carries on 
transport activities of goods or persons between two or more countries.52 Section 68bis 
provides that foreign companies carrying on an international transportation business are to 
keep an account of gross income before deduction of expenses regarding passenger fees, 
freight fees, and other taxable benefits, instead of keeping an ordinary balance sheet with 
operational profit and loss accounts.53 
 
Under Thai domestic law, different source rules are employed for transport of passengers 
and transport of goods. Transport of goods is taxable at a rate of 3 per cent of gross freight 
charges for transport to/from Thailand, regardless where the freight charges are collected. 
 
51  See, for example, Thailand Germany (1967), article 8(2), Treaties and Models, IBFD. 
52  Section 67 of the Revenue Code of Thailand has recently been amended in this regard by the Act of 22 May 2019, No. 
52, available at: https://www.thailandlawonline.com/revenue-code/corporate-income-tax-law-in-the-revenue-code (last 
accessed: 1 January 2021). 
53  Section 66 and 67 of the Revenue Code of Thailand, available at the website of the Thai tax authorities at 
https://www.rd.go.th/5939.html#mata67 (last accessed: 1 January 2021) and also at 







Transport of persons to/from Thailand is taxable at the same rate, but only on gross ticketing 
revenue physically collected in Thailand. This difference might also explain the Thai 
preference of omitting a specific sourcing rule in its tax treaties. In practice, given the lack of 
source state taxing rights on air transport profits in nearly all treaties, including those with 
major airline ownership countries, Thailand has to refrain from taxing air transport profits as 
per its domestic law. 
 
4.3.10 Summary table 
 
The findings from analysis of relevant tax treaties and domestic rules on non-resident 


















Table 2 Source taxation in relation to the 10 biggest shipowner nations 
 
 
5  Conclusion: policy recommendations  
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate policy considerations that should guide a country’s 
decision to embrace source taxation of international transport profits in its tax treaties and 
domestic law. The study thereby aims to assist African countries that have shown interest in 
source taxation by expressing a reservation to Article 8(1) of the ATAF Model (2019), which 
provides for exclusive residence state taxation of international transport profits. 
 
Three types of objectives should be considered to answer the question whether and to what 
extent a country should pursue a tax treaty policy in line with Article 8 (Alternative B) of the 
UN Model: economic considerations (why tax international shipping activities), tax treaty 
negotiation considerations (how to amend/sign tax treaties with source taxation), and tax 
technical considerations regarding the drafting of the treaty provision (how to phrase the tax 
treaty provision). 
 
5.1 Economic considerations 
 
Revenue, fleet protection and environmental concerns 
 
There are a number of reasons for a source country to refuse to relinquish the right in its tax 
treaties to tax profits from international transport activities from sources in its territory. One of 
the most obvious reasons is the potential to gather tax revenue. A second reason is to 
protect or incentivise the development of a local fleet of air and maritime transport providers. 
A third reason, which is currently untested in treaty practice but will gain relevance in the 
(near) future, is the potential for the source country to use corporate income tax on shipping 
activities as a tool to foster environmental protection.  
 
The allure of the first consideration, gathering revenue, is clear. Given that ownership of the 
shipping business for African countries lays largely with non-resident enterprises, taxing their 
profits increases revenue without increasing the domestic tax burden. The exact dimensions 
of revenue generation potential depends on country-specific parameters, like the segments 







The second consideration is protection and development of a domestic fleet. As shown, for 
most African countries, there is a sharp contrast between the countries’ global share of 
inbound and outbound transport activities taking place in their territory, which is reasonably 
high, compared to the share of the global mercantile fleet represented by the countries’ 
national fleets, which is low. In other words, African countries generate a significant part of 
the business, but this business is almost entirely run by third-country operators.  
 
National fleet protection has been cited as a motivation for source taxation of transport profits 
in a number of countries analysed in this study. In the case of Pakistan, relinquishing source 
state taxing rights on maritime shipping income over time has been claimed to have stifled 
the once-thriving domestic maritime and aviation industry.54 This consideration is not without 
problems. Empirical evidence confirming the connection between source taxation and 
domestic shipping industry development is non-existent. Also, the case of the Philippines 
shows that if no domestic providers are able to replace services provided by foreign 
providers who are deterred by source taxation – the Philippines is said to have lost all direct 
long haul flight connections to Europe by European airlines because of the source tax, 
without domestic providers being able to offer similar connections – the tax might simply 
hamper a country’s global level of connectivity, and thus increase its cost of transport. If a 
country does host a national carrier competing for market share, source taxation could be a 
sensible approach – to counter the impact on this carrier of the liberalisation of the airspace 
under the so-called ‘fifth freedom’.55 
 
Regulation and taxation of the international transport business is generally based on two 
nexus – the flag state/state of registration and the residence state/ownership state.56 
Environmental standards have for a long time been exclusively enforced under the auspices 
of the flag state/state of registration.57 Recently, certain residence states/ownership states 
have started to use their domestic shipping tax regimes to incentivise certain environmental 
standards. A case in point are the recently updated Norwegian, Portuguese and Singaporean 
tonnage tax systems, which provide rebates for energy efficient and clean ships. Recently, 
Cyprus has amended its tonnage tax regime to grant as of 2021 a reduction of up to 30 per 
cent of tax for vessels using biofuels, hydrogen or electric power (NRDC 2018; Lexology 
2021). Source taxation could however provide a third nexus to enforce environmental 
policies, and reinforce the position of the port state as the state that is most affected by 
climate change (Falcão 2020b). 
 
Climate change is a global phenomenon, yet some of its symptoms – like rising sea levels 
and extreme weather (precipitation, fog and wind) – particularly affect source state/port 
states. These states incur extensive infrastructure costs, both in relation to physical damage 
sustained because of climate change-related events, as well as costs in relation to 
contingency planning. Cruise shipping is generally seen as a major source of CO2 and other 
types of pollution. A clear example of this policy conundrum is found in the cruise shipping 
 
54  See, for example, Ahmed (2020: 103-119). The author bases his study however on the assumption that a ship’s flag 
state is equal to the residence state for tax treaty purposes. One would believe that a ship’s ownership state is what 
matters for the purpose of a tax treaty, and not necessaritly the flag state. A ship’s flag does not entail any income tax 
consequences. 
55  The fifth freedom allows an airline to carry goods and transport between two third countries as a part of services 
connecting the airline's own country. The fifth freedom is one of the ‘freedoms of the air’, derived from the Chicago 
Convention, and which are the fundamental building blocks of the international commercial aviation route network. 
56  The flag state of a merchant vessel is the jurisdiction under whose laws the vessel is registered or licensed, and is 
deemed the nationality of the vessel. Merchant vessel registration is compulsory and can happen in only one 
jurisdiction, but may be changed over time. The expressions state of registration, flag state and state of nationality are 
generally considered to be synonymous. 
57  See, for example, the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL 1973) as modified 
by the Protocol 1978 relating thereto (MARPOL 73/78) and Annexes. Article 3(1) of the MARPOL provides that the 






industry. In a recent policy recommendation by Transport & Environment, an NGO 
campaigning for zero emission transport,, the cruise industry was strongly urged to embrace 
battery technology to generate power when moored in cities. In response, the shipping 
industry stated that improving the cruise shipping fleet with battery technology is one thing, 
but this will not solve the problem that few ports have the necessary battery-charging 
infrastructure, and that provision of this infrastructure requires significant investment by the 
port states.58 
 
Source taxation can aid port states in developing countries to mobilise domestic resources 
for this purpose, while at the same time incentivising low-impact transport. 
 
The following further considerations determine whether source taxation of international 
transport is an expedient policy. For each of these issues, consideration should be given to 
the prime objectives of revenue-gathering, fleet protection and environmental concerns.  
 
• Taxing transport of passengers and/or goods 
 
It has not been applied in treaty practice, but theoretically it is possible to distinguish between 
profits from the transport of passengers (no source state taxing rights) and profits from the 
transport of goods (source state taxing rights). This distinction would effectively result in 
distinguishing air transport (no source state taxing rights) and maritime transport (source 
state taxing rights), given the prevalence of the transport of goods over passengers in the 
maritime shipping industry and the prevalence of transport of passengers over goods in the 
air transport industry. 
 
• Taxing inbound and/or outbound transport? 
 
An important policy consideration that was discussed by the UN Committee of Experts during 
the initial development of Article 8 (Alternative B) of the UN Model is the distinction between 
inbound and outbound activities. It was generally believed that outbound transport should be 
taxed at a higher level than inbound transport. It was suggested for the Model provision to 
distinguish between a lower reduction of source state taxation under domestic tax law on 
inbound transport than on outbound transport. This nuance is not reflected in the UN Model 
and Commentary. Given that the Committee was unable to agree on exact rates, the Model 
merely provides that the rate of source state tax reduction is to be determined in bilateral 
negotiations.  
 
In practice, this distinction is embraced by a number of countries, but in an inverse way. 
None of the treaties currently in force provides for such differentiated rates. However, under 
domestic law in a number of countries analysed, like Indonesia, the Philippines and Sri 
Lanka, only outbound transport – transport with origin in the source country – is effectively 
subject to tax, whereas inbound transport is left untaxed. 
 
There is a clear reason for this distinction and for the impetus to avoid taxation of inbound 
transport. Theoretically speaking, a foreign shipping company that is confronted in the source 
state with source taxation of shipping income is entitled under the tax treaty to relief from any 
double taxation to be provided in its state of residence. In practice, levying source taxation 
might increase the cost of shipping. Shipping companies might face increased compliance 
burdens due to tax liability in the source state and their tax position in the residence state 
(tax losses, tonnage tax system, etc.) might make it difficult to obtain a (direct) offset of the 
tax levied in the source state. This will increase the cost of transport and this cost will be 
 






charged to the customer, which in the case of import is located in the source state. The 
incidence of the source tax lays thus with the economic operators in the source state itself. 
 
A country’s ‘cost of international transport’ is an important key component of economic 
development, and national policies should be geared to keeping costs as low as possible. A 
country’s cost of international transport is generally considered to be the cost of transport as 
a fraction of the value of its imports (not its exports). For the reasons mentioned above, 
source taxation on import transport might adversely affect a country’s cost of transport.  
 
From an environmental perspective and the perspective of national fleet protection, there is 
however no reason to distinguish between inbound and outbound transport. 
 
5.2 Tax treaty network and negotiation considerations 
 
The following observations can be made with regard to signing tax treaties to implement a 
country’s desired policy to tax international transport at source. 
 
Are tax treaties necessary? 
 
A first obvious question is whether tax treaties are necessary to implement a national policy 
of taxing international transport profits at source. At first sight, tax treaties merely restrict the 
taxing powers of the signatory states. Without a tax treaty in force, a source state is entitled 
to tax all profits that are deemed subject to tax under its domestic law. However, the main 
objective of a tax treaty is not to limit national taxing powers – it is to avoid double taxation. 
Without a tax treaty having the residence state recognise the taxing rights of the source 
state, the former is not obliged to provide relief for double taxation in the form of a foreign tax 
credit or a tax exemption. In the absence of a treaty, such relief for double taxation might be 
available under the domestic law of the residence state – often it is not, or it is granted at less 
favourable conditions. Hence, to achieve neutrality of the source tax, it is crucial to sign a tax 
treaty. 
 
Signing transport tax treaties instead of comprehensive tax treaties? 
 
Historically, countries sign bilateral transport tax treaties in the absence of or in anticipation 
of a comprehensive tax treaty. Transport tax treaties are single issue treaties that only deal 
with double taxation of international transport income. Exclusive residence taxation is often 
seen as the baseline for negotiations on the matter. Given that these treaties are often simply 
solidifying domestic law reciprocity clauses (i.e. domestic tax law of a state providing for a tax 
exemption of non-resident transport income if resident shipping companies are exempt from 
source tax in the inverse case), transport tax treaties providing for source state taxation of 
international shipping income are extremely rare. 
 
Even though at the onset of development of the Models, exclusive residence state taxation of 
shipping income was seen by some as a one-sided concession by the source state, 
especially in a situation of asymmetrical flows of shipping income, in today’s reality the 
situation is the opposite. Source taxation is perceived as a concession granted by the 
residence state, which might be required to balance concessions on other issues granted by 
the source state.  
 
Signing comprehensive tax treaties without Article 8 (international traffic) 
 
In a number of older treaties signed by some of the Asian countries analysed, the signatory 






distinction has to be made between treaties omitting Article 8 with added express exclusion 
of international shipping profits from the scope of the treaty. Under these treaties, 
international shipping profits are not affected by the tax treaty, and are dealt with as if no 
treaty is in force. This implies that the source state can enforce its domestic tax law without 
restriction, yet the residence state is in no way obliged to grant relief for double taxation. 
 
A number of treaties omitting Article 8 do not contain an express exclusion of shipping profits 
from the scope of the treaty. Under these treaties, shipping profits fall under the standard rule 
on business profits laid down in Article 7 of the Models. This implies that the source state can 
tax international shipping profits to the extent that the PE threshold is met. Given the 
prevalence of exclusive residence state taxation, there is little international practice indicating 
whether and to what extent transport activities in the source state give rise to a PE. It is clear, 
however, that the PE threshold is different than the activity threshold (more than casual) in 
Article 8 (Alternative B) of the UN Model.  The UN Model Commentary provides that shipping 
activities are more than casual if it concerns a scheduled or planned visit of a vessel. 
Whether a visit – planned or unplanned – gives rise to a PE depends however on the 
existence of a place of business in the source state that is fixed, and through which the 
business is carried on. 
 
In treaty practice of the countries analysed, no activity threshold has been adopted in relation 
to source state taxing rights granted under Article 8. It is clear that applying Article 7 to 
international transport activities grants less extensive source state taxing rights, but 
nevertheless allows source state taxation in certain circumstances. This might be a valid 
policy option. 
 
Choice of tax treaty partner  
 
To the extent that the focus is on taxing profits from the maritime shipping of goods – it 
should be taken into account that over all individual segments of the industry, ownership of 
the business is centralised in the hands of enterprises located in only a handful of countries. 
Implementing a source tax policy should focus on signing or amending tax treaties with those 
countries. Which countries depends on the size and segments active in the individual 
country. If a country has a sizeable activity exporting oil and other hydrocarbon products, it 
can be assumed that the vessels involved are to a large extent owned by shipowners located 
in Greece or Japan. Obviously this is an approximation that needs to be verified based on 
actual port call data. 
 
It is important to scrutinise carefully which countries are selected to implement the policy, 
and to steer clear of making tax treaty concessions to insert source state taxation of shipping 
profits if these treaties are being signed with states that do not host a sizeable shipping 
industry that generates transport activities in the country. If this is not the case, the cost of 
treaty concessions to obtain source taxation might exceed the benefits of source taxation. 
 
Additional focus should be on neighbouring countries and countries in near proximity with 
sizeable domestic fleets. A prime example is the Indonesia Singapore Tax Treaty, which 
provides for source taxation and is crucial for Indonesia to tax the massive influx of 
Singaporean operators providing domestic transport in Indonesia. In Indonesia, the levying of 
source taxation under the Treaty is seen as extremely relevant to protect its domestic fleet.  
 
Geographic location of the country in question 
 
Finally, research on the global practice in tax treaties of adopting source state taxation of 






region, namely South/South-East Asia. Two elements explain the concentrated regional 
character of this particular tax treaty practice. First, all the countries that have embraced 
source taxation are blessed with a geographical position on one of the major maritime line 
shipping routes – namely the Europe-Asia Pacific route. As such, these countries do not 
have to rely on their domestic policies to actively attract shipping lines. Second, there are 
clear benefits in adopting source taxation as a regional cluster of countries as it creates a 
regional level playing field and avoids individual countries adopting a beggar my neighbour 
policy. If international shipping companies are confronted with source taxation in the whole 
region, it is less likely that these companies will reroute traffic for the purpose of avoiding 
source taxation. 
 
Whereas most African countries - especially sub-Saharan countries - do not benefit from a 
similar beneficial position in the global shipping network, the countries should strive for a 
regional approach towards the implementation of source taxation of shipping income. For 
instance, coastal countries like Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo, Benin and Nigeria have all 
expressed interest in adopting source taxation. To implement this policy effectively and to 
avoid tax-induced distortions of the business, the countries should deal with this issue as a 
cluster of countries, and coordinate their approach towards amending or signing tax treaties 
with individual ship-owning states. This coordination could entail joint and/or parallel tax 
treaty negotiations (Falcão and Michel 2020a). 
 
Arguments countering a principled stance to conserve exclusive residence state 
taxation 
 
Source taxation is not part of the residence state’s tax treaty policy. Research shows 
that each of the ten biggest ship-owning nations has in at least one tax treaty agreed to grant 
source state taxing rights in relation to maritime shipping income. Similarly, nearly all OECD 
member states have agreed to source taxation in one or more of their tax treaties.  
 
There is a historic consensus on exclusive residence state taxation. There is a long-
standing praxis in tax treaties to tax shipping profits exclusively in the residence state. From 
the onset of the development of the first models, opinions regarding the theoretical 
underpinnings of exclusive residence state taxation have been divided. Theories on the 
division of taxing rights, like benefits theory, the theory of economic allegiance, and theories 
of distributive justice, do not exclude source taxation. Exclusive residence state taxation has 
prevailed in practice only because of practical considerations regarding enforceability and 
compliance. 
 
Enforceability and compliance difficulties make source state taxation impossible. This 
1920s creed has lost much of its merit in the age of data and transparency in tax matters. If 
in the era of digital economy, offshore providers of digital services can be forced to collect 
data on their virtual business in a certain country, shipping companies should be deemed 
able to collect and compile data on their shipping activities per destination. In many instances 
this data exists, if not for the companies own managerial purposes, then for the purpose of 
complying with other regulatory requirements – such as port duties and excise taxes (Falcão 
and Michel 2020b). 
 
There is no guidance available regarding profit attribution. This is correct with regard to 
the UN Model, and this lacuna needs to be addressed. If the UN Model provides for source 
state taxing rights on shipping profits, it should also provide for detailed guidance on profit 








Profit attribution guidance and practice does exist, however. The bilateral tax treaty network 
is far from complete, and any of the major shipowner states, has been confronted in the past 
with its resident companies deriving shipping profits from source countries with which no tax 
treaty is enforced. Hence, even countries staunchly defending exclusive residence state 
taxation have an interest in developing generally accepted standards for profit attribution for 
shipping companies. This explains, for instance, why IATA strongly advocates for exclusive 
residence state taxation, yet at the same time encourages its member countries to embrace 
the standardised profit attribution rules.  
 
Also, in the inverse case, it makes sense for residence countries to develop profit attribution 
rules. The example of Australia illustrates that residence countries generally do have 
experience with the attribution of locally sourced shipping profits derived by non-resident 
shipping companies located in countries without a treaty. Countries like Australia tax these 
profits under their domestic law, even if levying tax at source on shipping profits is clearly 
contrary to their tax treaty policy. This is explained by the fact that residence countries will 
usually use this tax as a bargaining chip and exercise their tax sovereignty under domestic 
law merely to encourage other states to sign tax treaties and to obtain concessions in 
exchange for limiting the exercise of this sovereignty. The exercise of this sovereignty 
required profit attribution rules, and hence Australia’s adherence to the methods proposed by 
IATA. 
 
The international shipping business operates at tight profit margins and is very 
capital-intensive – source taxation might stifle the profit margins. Most analysists agree 
that the pressure on profit margins in the biggest shipping enterprises is generated by the 
creation of over-capacity. One of the reasons used to explain the recurring problem of over-
capacity is said to be the untargeted use of preferential tax regimes for shipping companies 
in shipowner states, like tonnage tax systems. These regimes artificially stimulate the 
creation of over-capacity that puts pressure on the profit margins. It would be perverse to 
fend off source taxation for a problem that is partly caused by inefficient tax policies in the 
residence state. On the contrary, source taxation could serve as a minimum tax, thereby 
alleviating the creation of overcapacity.  
 
5.3 Considerations regarding drafting of the treaty provision 
 
With regard to tax technical considerations for drafting the treaty provision, it is advisable to 
revert to the building blocks identified in the analysis of tax treaty practice. These building 
blocks are: income covered, source state taxing rights, sourcing rule, method of taxation, and 




Under the Models, the international transport article covers income from the operation of 
ships in international traffic, with international traffic covering both cross-border transport as 
well as domestic transport provided by a foreign enterprise (cabotage). Certain treaties 
restrict source state taxing rights only to cover income from cabotage. 
 
Under Article 8 (Alternative B) of the UN Model, source state taxing rights are granted only to 
income from international maritime shipping, not air transport. This is usually followed in 
treaty practice, although it is a valid policy option to also grant source state taxing rights to air 
transport profits. 
 
The activity threshold (more than casual) in Article 8B of the UN Model has not been adopted 






are better inserted into domestic law of the source state, for the latter to keep control over the 
scope and impact of the exemption threshold. 
 
Under the OECD Model – which has an inherent bias to favouring residence states – there is 
a policy pull towards expanding the scope of business income covered under the 
international transport article, because all income covered under Article 8 avoids possible 
source state taxation by application of the PE rule of Article 7. As such, not only profits 
directly obtained from transport activities, but also profits from activities directly connected 
with these operations, and profits not directly connected but ancillary to transport operations 
are included.59 Examples of these profits covered are profits from wet leasing of ships or 
aircraft, profits from connected transport on different transport modes by land, profits from 
ticket sales on behalf of other transport companies for transport connected to its own 
transport activities, and profits from the lease of containers for the transport of goods or 
temporary storage of goods. This understanding of the extensive scope of Article 8 is also 
absorbed in the UN Model.  
 
To the extent source state taxing rights are granted in the tax treaty, these rights apply to all 
income deemed covered under Article 8. The fact that under Article 8B source state rights 
are granted that are not granted under Article 8A of the UN Model does not alter the scope of 
the income covered under the Article, which is the extensive scope reflected in the OECD 
Commentary. States do not need to make this explicit in their tax treaties. 
 
Source state taxing rights 
 
There is a consensus amongst states adopting source taxation and the drafters of the UN 
Model that the taxing rights granted cannot be exercised without limitations, and that a 
source state should at least agree to grant a reduction of the tax normally levied on non-
resident shipping income under its domestic tax law. 
 
Two policy options exist – a proportional reduction, or an absolute maximum threshold as in 
the case of source taxation on passive income. The UN Model and most treaty practice 
applies a proportional reduction, which is usually set at 50 per cent but which ranges across 
treaties between 40 and 66 per cent. The Philippines is the only country that favours the 
inclusion of an absolute threshold, formulated as a maximum percentage of tax on gross 
income covered. In the case of the Philippines, the limit is set at a maximum of 1.5 per cent 
of tax. 
 
Jurisprudence in Indonesia shows that there is a strong argument in favour of using a 
proportional threshold rather than an absolute threshold. The absolute threshold implies that 
the rate – usually determined as a fixed reduction of the standard gross rate on shipping 
income under domestic law (e.g. 2.5%) – implies that this is the maximum rate applicable to 
all income covered under the shipping article in the tax treaty. As shown above, the scope of 
the income covered under the shipping article is usually wide, as it covers also directly 
connected and ancillary income. However, income covered under the shipping article in the 
treaty is not necessarily income considered as shipping income under domestic law. For 
instance, domestic tax law might provide a low rate of 2.5 per cent on ordinary shipping 
income, but ancillary income from ticket sales might be taxed at the ordinary rate (e.g. 20%) 
on services provided by non-resident service providers. A reduction of this rate to the 
absolute maximum rate of 1.5 per cent in the treaty might not be desirable, whereas a 
proportional reduction of the 20 per cent rate by 50 per cent might be more suitable.  
 
 






Finally, in treaties that expressly provided source state taxing rights for profits from cabotage 
(but not for other types of international transport), the source state taxing rights are usually 




The sourcing rule determines which income is deemed to be derived from sources in the 
source country, and which income can thus be taxed in the country. 
 
In the treaty practice of the countries studied, there is a wide variety of wording used. There 
are three types of sourcing rules used in treaty practice: the no-rule source rule, the open 
end source rule, and the limited source rule. The limited source rule is the standard rule used 
in most treaties, and also in Article 8B of the UN Model. It limits the scope of source state 
taxing rights to income from transport taking place in the source state. The nexus is the place 
where the operation of the transport takes place. If part of it takes place in the source state, 
the source state can tax the profits attributable to this part of the activities. The open rule 
refers to income derived from the source state, without any further specification. Income can 
be deemed to be derived from the source state because part of the transport takes place in 
the source state, but also because payments for the transport have been made in the source 
state, regardless of whether the transport takes place in the source state or not. In this case, 
the nexus is to be defined under domestic law of the source state. A similar outcome is 
achieved under the ‘no-rule rule’. A surprisingly high number of treaties omit any definition of 
source in the treaty provision. These treaties merely provide that the source state can tax 
income from international traffic, without further specification. Albeit probably a design flaw 
rather than intentional policy, this rule implies that the source state can tax international 
transport profits even if there is no nexus or little nexus at all with the source state. 
 
It is believed that the most optimal solution is the limited source rule, given that it focuses on 
the place of activities, rather than the place of the payer. Article 8B should be seen as a 
variation to the PE rule – which also used the place of activities as the nexus, rather than a 
variation on Article 12A of the UN Model on ‘fees for technical services’. Under Article 12A, 
fees for technical services are deemed to arise in a state if the payer is a resident of that 
state.60 Source taxation of shipping profits should not follow this approach. The purpose is to 
tax international transport activities that take place in the source state. The focus should not 
be on taxing base-eroding payments in the source state for transport services rendered 
elsewhere. 
 
Under domestic tax law of certain countries, like the Philippines and Sri Lanka, the limited 
source rule is further restricted by providing that only payments, wherever made, for 
outbound transport are deemed to have their source in the country. Given what has been 
mentioned above regarding inbound and outbound transport, this rule should be considered 
best practice, and – albeit never tested in actual treaty practice – nothing prevents a state 
from inserting this restriction in the tax treaty itself. Countries like Pakistan and India employ 
a mixed nexus approach in their domestic law to tax gross payments, wherever received, for 
outbound transport, and gross payments for inbound transport if received in Pakistan. In this 
case, payments abroad for inbound transport are left untaxed.  
 
The research also revealed that other countries have the understanding that source state 
taxing rights can de facto only be exercised if the payer of the transport services is located in 
the source country where the transport takes place. Therefore, 8B-type treaty provisions 
 






would not apply in those triangular cases where the payer of the transport services is 
situated in a third country (a country other than that where the goods are to be delivered).  
A typical example would an American MNE signing a contract with a European transport 
company to pick up consumer goods that have been manufactured by an Indonesian 
subcontractor, and are to be transported to the logistical distribution centre of the MNE in 
Europe. In this case, since there is no corresponding payment in Indonesia for the transport, 
no tax can be withheld on gross receipts. To circumvent this problem, domestic law in the 
source state should instate a requirement for non-resident transport companies to register in 
the country and to assign a trading agent. The trading agent would then be responsible to 
collect the tax due based on the information received by its principal.  
 
Method of taxation and interaction with domestic law 
 
Unless the treaty provision provides for an absolute threshold of a maximum tax rate levied 
on gross receipts, the treaty provision is drafted in neutral terms regarding the choice for the 
source state to tax non-resident shipping income on gross or on net basis.  
 
In practice, most countries analysed tax gross income at a rate that is significantly lower than 
the statutory corporate tax rate. The tax is levied on gross receipts for inbound and outbound 
transport. The statutory rate of tax on gross non-resident shipping income is often based on 
a deemed profit margin, taxed at the statutory corporate tax rate. Sri Lanka appears to be the 
only exception, allowing net taxation at the ordinary corporate tax rate, but only if the non-
resident meets the domestic PE threshold. 
 
Arguably, a suitable approach might be to offer non-resident taxpayers the choice between 
gross taxation based on effective receipts and a deemed profit margin taxed at the ordinary 
tax rate, irrespective of losses or expenses, and net taxation with application of the maritime 
formula or Calcutta formula to take into account losses and expenses. To some extent, this 
dual system would mirror the policies employed in the shipowner state that often consist of 
granting an optional tonnage tax system, which is essentially a system allowing taxation 
based on fleet capacity (instead of receipts), and a deemed profit margin taxed at the 
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